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ABSTRACT 
The present study attempted to bring together advances in research regarding the 
recall of autobiographical memory (Bruhn and Bellow, 1984; Bruhn, 1985, 1990) 
and Higgins (1987) theoretical formulations regarding the association of self 
discrepancies (ideal, ought) with specific emotional vulnerabilities.'A review of the 
literature led to the formation of the following hypotheses: 
1. High ideal discrepancy subjects will recall more dejection - related 
emotions asociated with their past events, and will rate them more 
intensely than low ideal discrepancy subjects. 
2. Low ideal discrepancy subjects will recall more elation-related emo-
tions associated with their past events, and will rate them more 
intensely than high ideal discrepancy subjects. 
3. High ought discrepancy subjects will recall more agitation - related 
emotions associated with their past events, and will rate them more 
intensely than low ought discrepancy subjects. 
4. Low ought discrepancy subjects will recall more tranquility - related 
emotions associated with their past events, and will rate them more 
intensely than low ought discrepancy subjects. 
5. High discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought) will recall more 
events with negative outcomes than will low discrepancy subjects. 
6. Low discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought) will recall more 
events with positive outcomes than will high discrepancy subjects. 
7. High discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought) will rate the overall affect 
of the recalled events as more unpleasant than low discrepancy subjects. 
8. Low discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought) will rate the overall 
effect of the recalled events as more pleasant than will high 
discrepancy subjects. 
9. There will be no difference between the impact ratings of positive events 
recalled by high and low discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought). 
10. There will be no difference between the impact ratings of negative events 
recalled by high and low discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought). 
11. The behaviours of the significant other towards high ideal 
discrepancy subjects in the recalled events will be more indicative of 
an absence of positive reinforcements, whereas for low ideal discrep-
ancy subjects, the behaviour of the significant other will be more 
indicative of a presence of positive reinforcements. 
12. The behaviour of the significant other towards high ought 
discrepancy subjects in the recalled events will be more indicative of 
a presence of negative reinforcements, whereas for low ought dis-
crepancy subjects, the behaviour of the significant other in the re-
called event will be more indicative of an absence of negative rein-
forcements. 
/ Data were collected from a final total of 82 post graduate students from various 
departments of Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh Imean age = 23.3yr) using the 
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following tools: 
(1) Self Discrepancy Questionnaire. 
(2) Life Events toterview. 
(3) Life Events Rating Scale. 
The data were analysed using three kinds of statistical analyses: Chi-square, 
Kolmogorov-Sinimov, and ANOVA. The results confirmed certain assertions and 
assumptions of Higgins (1987) Self Discrepancy theory, and Bruhn and Bellow's 
(1984; Bruhn, 1990) theoretical formulations regarding the influence of present 
attitudes and moods on the autobiographical memory of the person. However the 
hypotheses regarding the expected relationship between low ought discrepancy and 
tranquility rekited emotion, and the hypotheses of no difference between high and 
low discrepancy groups (ideal, ought) with respect to the impact ratings of negative 
events were not confirmed by the obtained results. Directions for further research 
are suggested. 
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Chapter-1 
INTRODUCTION 
The integration of both social-cognitive and psycho-dynamic 
theories has opened up new avenues for exploring the relationship between 
memories and the self-concept. It is well known that the self-concept is an 
out come of the experiences that have been accumulated throughout the past, 
and that we refer back to them whenever we go through a similar experience. 
Events which, we believe, have had a profound impact on our personality are 
much more easily remembered and recalled than daily events which we 
usually encounter throughout our lifespan - right from childhood and adoles-
cence to adulthood. Many social, environmental, and personality variables 
play important roles in determining the impact of the experience at the time 
of its occurrence, and in stabilizing the self concept over the years. In fact, 
along with attitudes and values, an individual's self-concept has been found 
to show remarkable stability over a period of time (Mischel, 1981) and is 
more enduring than the various behaviours which people exhibit in different 
situations. Thus, although what people do in the past may be situation-
specific, individuals are able to categorize and conceptualize themselves in 
a stable manner with certain dispositional terms and motives that go far 
beyond the information that is obtained by mere observation of behaviour. 
Past events are thus instrumental in the formation of self-concept attributes 
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self-concept attributes in an individual, which are fairly resistant to change, 
although modifications may take place according to the type of situations 
encountered. 
In order for an individual to conceptualize and categorize information 
from past experiences into significant schemata about the self, the past event 
or experience must have some significance for the individual. Indeed, an 
important event should have some distinguishing characteristic(s) that make 
it unique enough for the person to be able to recall it again and again, thus 
enabling him to base his judgements during future encounters on those 
particular elements derived from past experience. Thus, recall of significant 
events may be influenced by certain factors which took place at the time of 
occurrance of the event, which may in turn influence the self-concept of the 
individual. Many researchers have discussed the interdependent relation 
between development of autobiographical memories and a development of a 
sense of the self (Bartlett, 1932; Neisser, 1982; Bruhn,1990; Snow, 1990). 
Some important factors of past experiences which influence their retention 
in memory and subsequent recall later in life, could be . (1) most significant 
events involve the self; (2) they usually contain some interaction with a 
significant other (for eg. parents, siblings, close friend, spouse, teacher, 
etc.) whose attitudes and opinions the individual values the most, next to his 
own; (3) past experiences which are significant usually involve emotional 
reactions which is the reason why the person usually remembered the event 
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in the first place, and (4) the experience usually has a significant outcome for 
the individual which may make the experience pleasant or unpleasant for 
him/her. These factors many be instrumental in making the event significant 
for the individual, and may also act as a reference to guide the individual 
through similar future events. The more a person recalls or remembers 
certain events pertaining to a particular self attribute present in his sche-
mata, the more reinforced would be that particular attribute, and it would be 
incorporated into the concept of the individual. All this is possible due to the 
memory system which helps in retaining information relevant to the self. 
An individual's memory is comprised of a number of self-schemata, 
which are cognitions formed from past experiences. Once formed, these 
self-schemata guide the manner in which the person deals with new informa-
tion regarding the self. In other words, self-schemata are used to interpret 
the feedback that the person receives from his experiences. Feedback which 
confirms the self-schemata (or a part of it) will reinforce that particular 
attribute of the self-concept whereas a disconfirmation of the attribute 
present in the schemata would produce discomfort in the individual, which 
would then result in one of the following (a) the person will either reject the 
feedback as false since it is not in compliance with these existing self-
schemata; or (b) the person may accept the feedback as true and modify his 
existing schemata to fit in with the information he has received, and thus his 
self-concept would be altered with respect to a particular part of it. Either 
way, the event would be retained in memory and would be retrieved whenever 
the person experiences a similar situation in future. 
Considering the fact that significant events of the past contain certain 
factors which help in both retention of the event in memory as well as 
confirmation / disconfirmation of self-relevant attributes, it is imperative to 
assess these factors one by one in order to find out the extent to which they 
play a role in the formation and maintainance of the self-concept. Although 
every individual undergoes unique experiences in his lifetime, there are 
certain common psychological and social factors which may influence the 
perception and interpretation of those events. The manner in which the 
person interprets and percieves these events may in turn determine the kind 
of self that forms within the individual. These factors are discussed in some 
detail below so as to present a clear picture of their possible effects, both 
direct and indirect, on the self-concept of the individual. 
The whole lifetime of a person revolves around the self. Needless to 
say, the experiences which would be the most easy to retrieve from memory 
would be the ones involving the self. According to Markus (1977), people 
are able to process and remember information which is personally relevant 
much better than people for whom the information is not personally relevant. 
People also have better recall for information about traits that belive they 
beleive describe them selves than for traits that are not self descriptive 
(Rogers, 1977; Rogers, Kuiper and Kirker, 1977; Bower and Gilligan, 
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1979). Thus, those events which revolve around the self where the person is 
the 'main character in the story', and events which are directed at personal 
attributes of the individual would be retained more readily and easily from 
memory than would those events in which the individual was merely an 
'onlooker'. Events in which the individual gains something (or loses some-
thing) important be it praise, self esteem or something materialistic, for 
example, may also be easily retained by the person. This tendency to achieve, 
or the need for achieving, is similar to that of goal - attainment behaviour. A 
person may want to achieve a number of things which would enhance his 
feeling of self esteem and a positive sense of well-being. Failure to attain or 
achieve the goal may result in a loss of self esteem and sense of well-being. 
Singer (1990) found that the relevance of a memory to attainment of goals 
predicted the affective response to an individual's memory - the more 
relevant a memory was to the attainment of a goal, the more positive affect 
it elicited. He also found that affective responses to memories cued by 
avoidance goals differed from responses to memories cued by approach 
goals. With regard to approach goals the memories were generally of attain-
ment of the goals and affect was primarily positive, but memories with 
regard to avoidance goals were most often of failure to avoid the undesired 
outcome, and affect was generally negative. This study suggests that 
attaintment/ non attainment of goals that the individual set for himself, or 
failure to avoid an undesired outcome may be important for the individual 
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due to the effect the have on his self-concept. The positive or negative affect 
elicited only serves to make the memory more significant for the individual. 
Much research has been conducted on the manner in which informa-
tion is stored into, and retrieved from memory. While attempting to 
retrieve a particular event from the vast amount of organised self-informa-
tion in memory, individuals do not recall just the factual information, but 
instead recall the information in the manner in which they have interpreted 
it. This is termed reconstruction of memory. Bartlett (1932) was amongst 
the earliest of psychologists to present a theory of self-schemata, the 
hypothetical construct which helps retain in memory all those informations 
related to the self that fit in with the person's existing self concept. Bartlett 
emphasised that the factual details mesh with the persons existing attitude 
while encoding an event into memory, at the time of recall, recalled event. 
Many studies conducted later provided supporting evidence to this effect 
(Cantor and Mischel, 1977;Markus, 1977; Roger, Kuiper and Kirker, 1977; 
Bower and Gilligan, 1979; Kuiper and Rogers, 1979; Ferguson etal. 1983). 
Bruhn and Bellow (1984) later proposed their Cognitive Perceptual theory, 
in which they emphasized that an individuals memories reflect a general 
impression, rather than just a factual picture of what actually took place. 
They further stated that a person recalls only those information that fit in 
with his self-schema, and those information that do not fit his present 
self-schema are ignored. Thus, as a result, when a person recalls a memory 
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from his past, it would reflect his concept of what he thinks he actually is. 
Such memories may, however, be replaced by other memories if the person 
changes his concept of himself with the passage of time. 
Both the above theories place emphasis on encoding of self - relevant 
material into memory, which, when recalled, will reflect a person's 
personality, his ideals, and his expectations. The main factor which is 
important in both theories is that the recalled account need not necessarily 
be one hundred percent true with regard to the factual details. What is of 
interest is that manner in which the person incorporates the event into 
memory so that it fits in with his self-concept. The present study, thus, is 
more concerned with the details of the reconstructed past event, rather than 
the true factual details of what happened in the past. 
The number and intensity of emotions present in past recalled expe-
riences is a characteristic feature of past events. Recalled experiences that 
are important enough for the individual almost always contain strong affec-
tive content. Miles (1893) was amongst the earliest psychologists to note 
this, and he very effectively stated that "an emotion of some sort is evidently 
what made the experience originally impressive" (p. 555), a notion later 
agreed upon by Henri and Henri (1896, 1898), and Dudycha and Dudycha 
(1933, a, b). Interestingly, Dudycha and Dudycha were amongst the first to 
make an extensive study of the relationship of emotions to early memories. 
Much later. Brown and Kulik (1973) found that an event which was of great 
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emotional significance was recalled better than were non-emotional ones. 
Emotional content in memories thus is shown to influence memory, and that 
it affects the self-concept as well was suggested by Levine et al (1994) who 
found that "individuals tend to form a concept of themselves by using the 
affect associated with their experiences as a basis for information, along 
with the descriptive information provided by memory of the event, "although 
affective information may always take priority over descriptive knowledge 
in making these judgements..." (p. 74). 
Emotions, or affect, may be primarily of two types - positive and 
negative-and the effect they elicit on the self-esteem helps in formation of 
certain self-schemata. Since the need for experiencing positive affect is 
related to a sense of wellbeing , then a person who experiences negative 
affect as a result of failing to achieve, or who fails to confirm an existing self 
standard through his experiences, should feel a loss or absence of 
wellbeing, or in other terms, a loss of self-esteem. The need to experience 
positive emotions and avoid negative ones is driven by a desire to experience 
high self esteem. Pyszczynski and J. Greenberg (1987) found that negative 
affect initially arises as a result of losing a significant source of self-
esteem, but is also maintained by a depressive focussing style. Thus, a failure 
to meet a self standard would initially result in experiencing negative 
feelings, and chronic reinforcement of these feelings by 
subsequent similar situations may result in a depressive focussing style. The 
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individual may thus learn to interpret and expect similar outcomes in the 
future, whether positive or negative, which will lead to a gradual formation 
ofa positive or negative, self-concept. It may be possible then, that a person 
with a negative self-concept of himself will recall part experences which 
helped in the formation of such a concept, and vice-versa for a person with 
a positive self-concept. The importance of affect in memories, thus, cannot 
be discounted. The affect experienced by the person at the time of occur-
rence, and whether the person feels the same at the time of its recall should 
be considered, and if the intensity of the emotion is similar at both points of 
time, then it may indicate that the event was important enough for the person, 
and that such similar occurances have played a significant role in shaping the 
self-concept to what it presently is. 
The nature of the event in terms oipositivity and negativity is another 
characteristic feature of significant past experiences and may also play a 
dominant role in the shaping of the sense of self and self-concept in the 
individual. Holmes and Rahe (1967) related event properties such as affec-
tive meaning, frequency, intensity and so on, to psychological adjustment. 
However, one of the fundamental assumptions of this approach is that 
positive and negative events should receive equal weighting in analyzing 
event / wellbeing relationships. Till now, the focus has been on negative 
events and their emotional consequences (for a review see Higgins, 1987). 
In recent times however, positive events have been receiving attention. 
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although according to Reich, Zautra and Hill (1987), "an articulated concept 
of either positive events or positive well being is still lacking." (p. 170). 
Even so, the nature of the event is closely associated with certain types of 
emotions, (previously discussed) as well as with distinct types of outcomes, 
which are further discussed below. 
Rehm (1978) characterised positive events as "any event that is 
pleasant, enjoyable or rewarding" and negative events as "unpleasant, aver-
sive, or punishing."(p. 885) The outcome of negative events leads to negative 
psychological situations which lower self-esteem (Higgins, 1987) and give 
rise to different emotions such as sadness, anger, fear, embarassment, 
shame, disgust, contempt, guilt, etc. (Moffit and Singer, 1994), while posi-
tive experiences lead to feelings of happiness and pride, and to global self-
esteem. Thus, an individual categorizes an event as positive or negative by 
evaluating the feelings and emotional reactions associated with its outcome. 
Focusing on the outcome of the event leads an individual to become aware of 
his own performance in the experience and may either confirm or disconfirm 
certain attributes of his self-concept. 
According to a causal model proposed by Reich and Zautra (1987), 
"positive events enhance one's sense of control over the events in one life, 
... allow for an enhancement of positive mood, generate optimism about 
upcoming events and raise self-esteem, among other possible outcomes. 
Negative events, conversely, lower one's sense of control and consequently 
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raise threats about future control, increase distress, negative mood, 
depression and symptomatology, amongst other unfavorable outcomes" 
(p. 169). 
It has also been observed, however, that positive events are 
sometimes stressful, a view supported by emperical findings (Block and 
Zautra, 1981; Vinokur and Selzer, 1975;Zautra and Simons, 1979). This may 
be due to readjustment stress (Holmes and Rahe, 1967) or it maybe that some 
positive events are out of our control (Zautra and Reich, 1980), with a 
consequent negative impact. 
Apart from the fact that the self is present in most of the significant 
memories of an individual, the role of significant others cannot be 
sidestepped. Most meaningful interactions are those that take place with 
people close to the individual, right from childhood to adulthood. Parents 
are the most important of these significant others for several reasons firstly, 
because they are usually the earliest models in the child's developmental 
span; secondly, because they are the models present for the longest period in 
the child's life, usually being present longer them any other social agent; and 
thirdly, they are the people who exert the most power, both physical and 
emotional, in the child. They provide nurturance and control his resources, 
and in his early life, his very survival depends on them. The child thus bases 
his learning on observation of his parents early in life, particularly the 
mother. Since the parents exert so much physical and emotional as well as 
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psychological control over the child, it is but natural that he models his 
personality according to their standards, expectations, and ideals. 
According to Andersen and Baum (1994), socialization for individu-
als starts early in life, with children forming a strong relationship with their 
parents (and to a lesser extent, with siblings). This basis serves as a reference 
when the child begins to socialize with others outside the protection of his 
home, and the child may often compare other people with his parents, and 
interpret their actions the way he would interpret his parent's actions. This 
process has been termed 'parataxis' or 'parataxic distortion' after Sullivan 
(1940, 1953). The process of parataxis in later stages of life may lead the 
individual to develop close relations with other people who become impor-
tant parts of his life. These, may include, for example, siblings, a close 
friend, a spouse, an extended family member, a teacher, etc. Thus, while the 
individual may definitely have past memories of important events with his 
parents, he may almost certainly have memories of interactions with other 
significant others. The parents thus influence the early formative years of 
life by setting a pattern of socialization for the child so that he may interact 
with others who may become significant at a later stage. In the light of the 
above, it could be assumed that early memories of an individual would mostly 
revolve around the parents, as well as around the sibling's teacher and 
friends, who are theearliest external agents with whom the child learns to 
form relationships. 
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It is very obvious that the behaviour of the parents and other early 
external agents of the socialization process of the child would have a very 
profound impact on his/her personality. Freud (1921) believed that the first 
few years of life determined the personality formation of the child in later 
years. Indeed, recent evidence supports this psychoanalytic viewpoint. It has 
been shown that living with warm, caring, communicative 
understanding and supportive parents is positively related to wellbeing in 
adolescents (Hauser et al., 1985; Werner and Smith, 1982), whereas a lack 
of warmth, nurturance and inconsistency or lack of love and affection was 
found to be related to high levels of self-criticism (Firth - Cozens, 1992). It 
was also found that greater tendency to self-blame and self-criticism in 
adulthood were related to more negative reports of childhood experiences 
(Brewin et al., 1992). Coopersmith (1968) found that children with high self 
esteem were those who were exposed to parental models who displayed high 
self-esteem, and were more active, expressive, successful, 
self-confident, optimistic, and less anxious than the children who were 
exposed to parental models who displayed low self esteem. Thus, children of 
good parental models would be expected to grow up as mature and well 
adjusted with a fairly stable and clear concept of themselves and their self 
goals, whereas children who have had inconsistent and unpredictable. 
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unsucessful parents as models would be expected to grow up with similar 
inconsistencies and weaknesses and with more self-critical behaviour and 
ultimately, with a confused and unstable self-concept. Such children may 
also tend to develop a neurotic self-explanatory style and may feel more 
depressed than most well adjusted individuals. 
From the above details regarding certain salient features of 
significant memories, it may be assumed that these features help the event to 
be stored in detail in memory, and it is from these salient events and their 
outcomes that the individuals forms his self-concept. The types of events, 
their outcomes and impact on the individuals, their affective content and the 
role of significant others in the individuals' life span contribute to forma-
tion of the self-concept, and should therefore be manifested in the adults 
behaviour and should be expressed in the presence of a similar situation and 
relevant cues, thus, providing clues to his/her self-concept. Information 
related to the self is processed much quicker than information which is not 
self-relevant, and it is this information which guides the formation of the 
self-concept in a particular direction. It is obvious as discussed above, that 
past interactions as well as reactions to past situations will teach the 
individual a certain pattern of learning and responses. Interactions with 
significant others will teach the person unique ways of responding to people 
in the future; the past emotional reactions by the individual may be either 
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reinforced or eliminated depending upon the outcome of the event. The 
person will then be able to modify his self according to the self standards he 
has set for himself. The outcome and nature of the event is crucial in self-
concept formation and can be instrumental in either introducing, reinforc-
ing, eliminating or discouraging certain self attitudes in the individual. 
Whenever a person is able to meet or fulfill his self-standards ( ie 
those self attributes that the person wishes to or expect to fulfill) he 
experiences a sense of satisfaction . However , when a person fails or is 
unable to meet his self standards, he experiences disconfort, and a dis 
crerpancy, or a difference is formed between the actual self attribute and the 
self standard that the person wishes or expects to possess. The more the 
discrepancy between the self attribute and the encountered standard, the 
more discomfort the person will experience. This has been elaborated in the 
theory of Self Discrepancy as formulated by Higgins (1987). 
The Self Discrepancy theory states that the greater the magnitude 
(i.e., availability) and accessibility (recency, frequency, and applicability of 
the stimulus event) of a particular type of self discrepancy possessed by the 
individual, the more the individual will suffer the kind of discomfort asso-
ciated with the type of discrepancy. More specifically, the theory states that 
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1) Actual selfldeal self discrepancy individuals will be vulnerable to 
dejection related emotions (eg; disappointment, dissatisfaction). 
2) Actual self- Ought self discrepancy individuals will be vulnerable to 
agitation related emotions (guilt, anxiety, etc). 
The self discrepancy focuses on the relationship between discrepan-
cies and negative emotional syndromes. According to Higgins, people pos-
sessing an actual : ought discrepancy might have experienced parental 
interaction that involved the presence of negative outcomes- for example 
parents who punished, criticized or rejected them for not living up to their 
expectations, parents who were intrusive or controlling, or parents who 
communicated to the children their own worries and auxieties about them. In 
contrast, people possessing actual :ideal discrepancies may have had an early 
history of interactions with parents that involved the absence of positive 
outcomes - parents who withdrew, abandoned, or paid little attention to the 
child when they could not live up to the standards set by the parents; parents 
who could not or did not satisfy feelings and needs of nurturance love and 
approval of the child; or parents who continuously communicated their 
disapproval and disappointment in the child. People who have both types of 
discrepancies may have experienced both types of interactions. Children 
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who are unable to live up to their parents' expectations experience intense 
emotional discomfort, which in the long run may lead to either a depressive 
or agitative style of functioning. Higgins has attempted to relate specific 
emotional syndromes with specific types of discrepancies which may be in 
turn related to an early history of faulty parental modelling. 
Higgins self discrepancy theory has focused on the etiology of dis-
crepancies and emotional consequences. Although Higgins has suggested 
that absence of actual own: ideal own discrepancy is associated with feelings 
of 'happiness' and 'satisfaction', whereas an absence of 
actual-own / ought-other discrepancy is associated with feelings of 'calm' 
and 'secure'(1987,p3^)he has not provided any supporting evidence in this 
regard, nor has he extended his theory to provide explanations for the 
absence of discrepancy and its relation with the self and affect. Furthermore, 
he has only mentioned faulty parental modelling as the major etiology in the 
formation of discrepancy. However, the memory of an individual does not 
contain only those experiences about the self that occured in childhood. 
According to Bruhn (1990), events that provide an identity to the self, 
especially the self in relation to others and to the world in general, are 
considered as important to the individual and are given priority in autobio-
graphical memory. Thus, it is clear that the events related to the self that are 
recalled by the individual from memory will be likely to reflect important 
aspects of the individual's self, irrespective of whether the events are 
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12. The behaviour of the significant other towards high ought 
discrepancy subjects in the recalled events will be more indicative of 
a presence of negative reinforcements, whereas for low ought dis-
crepancy subjects, the behaviour of the significant other in the re-
called event will be more indicative of an absence of negative rein-
forcements. 
Chapter-2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The present review of literature examines the studies which led to the 
formulation of the problem of the present study. Firstly, theories related to 
the formation and stability of the self concept will be examined; secondly, 
the theories & information processing, self schemata and early memories 
(EM's) will be discussed; and finally, the studies related to affect and the 
discrepancies in individuals and their consequences will be reviewed. 
Theoretical Conceptualizations of the Self : 
William James (1890/1901) referred to the self as "the empirical self 
- the sum total of all that he can call his", and divided the constituents of the 
self into four classes : (i) the material self which includes the body, family, 
home, and other personal possessions of the person, (ii) the social self, 
which includes the recognition that the individual gets from others, (iii) the 
spiritual self, which is a man's inner or subjective being, and, (iv) the pure 
ego, the most enduring and intimate part of the self. These four classes 
constitute what is better known as the actual self. James believed that people 
choose the type of self they want to become, although the individual is 
exposed to different characters at the onset of life, in order to follow 
anyone, "the rest must more or less be suppressed." While refering to of this 
selective process as part of the general phenomenon of selective attention, 
James stated that there was a "selective industry of the mind" by which he 
meant that people attend to and define as meaningful those stimuli and 
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experiences that they perceive as personally relevant and as suiting their 
private interests. He also believed that this selective memory was integral to 
all basic cognitive processes, especially to the self system, since it helps in 
formation of self identity and the type of behaviour. 
Soon after James 'empirical self, Cooley (1902/1964), propounded 
a 'looking - glass self theory. Influenced by the school of though known as 
symbolic interactiouism, Cooley's theory asserts that one's self concept is 
a reflection of one's perceptions about how one appears to others. Generally 
credited as the first interactionist, Cooley developed the idea of the looking 
- glass self, and stated that the self is inseparable from social life and 
necessarily involves some reference to others. This process of reference 
with respect to socialization results in the looking - glass self .Cooley 
observed that, "A self idea of this sort seems to have three principle elements 
: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of 
his judgement of the appearance, and same sort of self feeling, such as pride 
or mortification". (Cooley, 1902, p. 152). According to Cooley, the indi-
vidual from childhood develops concepts of the self by seeing how others 
respond to him/her: "In the presence of one whom we feel to be of impor-
tance, there is a tendency to enter into, and adopt, by sympathy, his judgment 
of himself." (p. 175). Thus, Cooley maintained that the looking- glass self is 
reflective of the way in which significant others perceive us to be. 
Freud (1927/1961) in his psychoanalytic theory, used the term 'ego' 
to refer to the processes by which the individual becomes aware of external 
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reality and makes judgements or decisions about what actions are relevant 
and appropriate. The term 'self, in psychoanalytic theory, generally refers 
to image, the impression one has about one's behaviour, and one's impact on 
others. Both the ego and the self are included by Freud in the general concept 
of personality. In addition, Freud also referred to the 'ideal' self as the ego 
-ideal, an aspect of the superego that serves as a reference point or as a 
standard in controlling behaviour. He thus assumed that there is a difference 
between the real self and the self that one ought to have, ought to be, or 
idealizes to be. Freud believed that an individuals' personality is determined 
in the first few years of life, and that later experiences and memories only 
serve as a cover-up for initial infantile memories which may block up the 
child's energy needed for further cognitive development. 
Adler(1929; 1931/1958) described the self as a highly personalized 
subjective system that interprets and makes meaningful the experiences of 
the organism. He also theorized that the self searches for experiences that 
will help that person in fulfilling his unique style of life. The style of life, 
according to Adler, is formed very early in childhood (by the age of four or 
five), and from then on, experiences are assimilated and utilized according 
to his unique life style. He also believed that attitudes, feelings, and apper-
ceptions are fixed and mechanized in childhood, thus becoming almost 
practically impossible to change afterwards. Even though it may seem as if 
the individual has acquired new habits, they are merely similar instances of 
the same basic style of life formed at an early age. Initially, Adler explained 
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the formation of the style of life as a result of an individual's inferiority 
complexes, and said that in order to compensate for these weaknesses, the 
individual strives to achieve superiority in that particular domain. However, 
not satisfied with his own explanation, Adler later conceived of the creative 
self as a self that gives meaning to life, by creating a goal for the individual 
as well as creating the means with which to achieve the goal. The creative self 
is constructed out of the raw material of heredity and experience, and the 
manner in which the person interprets these expanses. 
Adler was particularly interested in early, memories as an important 
key for understanding one's basic lifestyle. He believed that individuals 
reconstruct their past by selectively attending to, and retaining, those expe-
riences that fit in with their present life style. Adler used the method of early 
memory (EM) recollection to study personality. He believed that EM's are 
"the reminders a person carries about with him of his own limits and of the 
meanings of circumstances .... [They serve as] a story he repeats to himself 
to warn or comfort him, to keep him concentrated on his goal, to prepare 
him, by means of past experiences, to meet the future with an already tested 
style of action" (1937, p. 73). He believed that the earliest memory is of 
particular relevance in depicting one's fundamental attitude towards life. 
Unlike Freud, who believed that the retention of a particular memory has an 
unconscious association to a repressed infantile conflict, Adler believed 
that the key factor in the retention of a particular memory was the consis-
tency of the memory with the individuals' attitudinal frame of references, or 
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in other words, his life style. 
Mead (1934), the major theorist of symbolic interactionism, ampli-
fied and expanded the view of the self as a product of social interaction : "The 
individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly from 
the particular standpoints of other individuals of the same social group, or 
from the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he 
belongs" (p. 138). He observed that the self is a product of our symbolic 
interaction with others and that we can perceive ourselves only as a reflec-
tion in the eyes of another. Mead drew heavily on the writings of Cooley 
(1902) who described our tendency to use others as a kind of looking glass 
in which we can view ourselves. According toMead, essential to the genesis 
of the self is the development of the ability to take the role of the other and 
particularly to perceive the attitude of the other towards the perceiver. 
However, Mead also postulated that the looking - glass self is not only 
reflective of significant others, as Cooley suggested, but of a generalized 
other, that is, one's whole socio-cultural environment. 
Allport (1937) believed that the self is a developmental phenomenon 
derived from primitive states and past experiences. He proposed that all of 
the self (or ego) functions - (including bodily sense, self- identity, self-
esteem, self- extension, sense of selfhood, rational thinking, self- image, 
propriate striving, cognitive style, and the function of knowing) are vital 
parts of personality. These various functions, according to Allport, together 
form the basis of what we call attitudes, intentions, and evaluations, and 
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develop within the individual over different stages of the lifespan. Allport 
believed that such attitudes become more or less a consistent part of 
personality, and when the person grows up to be an adult, he will have a set 
of organised self - congruent traits. He stated that a normal adults past is no 
longer of interest, because the individual derives his motivation power not 
from primitive sources as he did in childhood, from future plans, goals and 
expectations. An immature, or seriously disturbed individual, on the other 
hand, acts without knowing why he acts, and his behavior may be more closely 
linked with events that took place in childhood than to events taking place in 
the here and now or the future. 
Rogers' (1951) theory of the self grew out of his experiences in 
working with individuals in the therapeutic relationship. From these experi-
ences, Rogers initially developed a theory of therapy and personality change. 
He later emphasized the construct of the self which is of fundamental 
importance to his theory. According to Rogers, the self consists of all the 
ideals, perceptions and values that characterize T or 'me'; it includes the 
awareness of'what I am' and 'what I can do'. This perceived self, in turn, 
influences both the person's perception of the world and his/her behaviour. 
This perceived self of Rogers can be likened to the self concept of the 
individual. An individual with a strong, positive self concept will view the 
world quite differently from one whose self concept is weak. Also, Rogers 
believed that the self concept does not necessarily reflect 
reality.A person may be quite good at studies, but may view 
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himself as a failure. 
According to Rogers, the individual evaluates every experience in 
relation to his self concept. Since people want to behave in ways consistent 
with their self concept, inconsistent experiences may be denied admittance 
to the conscious mind. The more are the areas of experience denied by the 
individual, the wider will become the gulf between the self and reality 
leading to emotional disturbances such as anxiety, depression, guilt, etc. 
Similarly, if the person is not close to the kind of ideal self he wishes to 
become, then an incongruency or a discrepancy will develop, resulting in an 
unhappy, dissatisfied individual. Rogers also adds that children are com-
pelled to exclude from their self concept those experiences that are not 
acceptable, so that they may win their parents positive regard. Such positive 
regard from parents leads to a healthy and positive self concept. 
Combs and Snygg (1959) conceived of the self concept as the center 
of a system of percepts that they called the phenomenal environment - the 
environment as it is perceived by the individual. The portion of the phenom-
enal environment that is perceived by the individual as being related to the 
self is termed the phenomenal self. Within the area of this environment are 
objects and events that the individual sees as somehow important to him. 
Combs and Snygg state that an individuals primary need is to organise his 
phenomenal world in such a manner as to maintain and enhance the phenom-
enal self. Since an individual cannot perceive all the events that are taking 
place in his phenomenal world, he tends to perceive only those events that are 
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related to his self. Thus the individual selectively attends to only those 
external events which have meaning for him. By structuring the environment 
in this manner, the individual is able to make predictions, assemble his 
behaviour in an orderly way, and to determine relationships between himself 
and past, present, and future events. 
Bem's (1967; 1972) theory of self- perception which was strongly 
influenced by Skinnerian behaviourism asserts that individuals, while mak-
ing inferences about themselves, use the same external information that is 
available to everyone else. Bem observed, "Self-description attitude state-
ments can be based on the individual's observations of his own overt behavior 
and the external stimulus conditions under which it occurs .... As such, his 
statements are functionally similar to those that any outsider observer could 
make about him" (1967, p. 185-186). For example if someone asks us how 
much we like ice-cream, we may recall how frequently do we eat ice-cream, 
and thus we may conclude that we like ice cream very much. In such an 
instance, the observer would have been able to assess our internal state (how 
much we like ice-cream) as we could, since the inferences were made on the 
basis of overt behaviour. Bem does not deny that the self perceiver has 
access to private information which the observer may not have, but he argues 
that this private information is used far less than we have assumed. Thus, 
according to Bem, a person forms a concept of himself based on the external 
information about themselves which is available to everyone else - ie, overt 
behaviour of the individual. 
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Jones and Gerard (1967) advocated the significance of the phenom-
enal self. According to them, the phenomenal self is "a person awareness, 
arising out of his (or her) interaction with the environment, of his/her own 
beliefs, values and attitudes, the link between them, and the implications for 
their behaviour, "(p. 716). Individuals have available an integrated represen-
tation of who they are,and this representation serves as an aid in interpreting 
the individuals behaviour at different stages and under different conditions. 
However, since the information about the phenomenal self is too vast to be 
recalled or remembered some aspects of the self are brought into awareness 
by the current situational and motivational cues which operate at that par-
ticular time. Furthermore, interaction with others, particularly significant 
others, help in stabilizing the phenomenal self since they see the individual 
in terms of stable traits and attitudes. Even so, the phenomenal self evolves 
over time to incorporate new information about the self and new behaviours. 
Duval and Wicklund (1972) proposed a theory of objective self-
awareness. In their theory, they assumed that "an individual who is objec-
tively self aware (of himself) will focus his attention on himself - his 
consciousness, personal history, or body.... objective self awareness may be 
brought about by external events that cause the individual to perceive himself 
as an object"(p. 14). 
Objective self awareness in an individual may also be created in the 
individual through the presence of others who the individual believes are 
focusing their attention on him. Duval and Wicklund believe that focusing 
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attention on the self leads to awareness of self discrepancies, and to the 
degree that a person is objectively self aware he will attempt to reduce 
discrepancies within himself or he will avoid the conditions leading to the 
objective state, since focusing on a discrepancy leads to negative affect. The 
more objectively self aware the person is, the more motivated the person 
will be to reduce the discrepancy. To support this hypothesis, Duval, Wicklund 
and Fine (1971). conducted an experiment in which the size of the discrep-
ancy and objective self awareness were varied orthogonally. They hypothesised 
that the combination of a sizeable discrepancy and objective self awareness 
would maximise avoidance of the situation. Subjects were led to believe that 
a dimension of their actual self was either discrepant or not discrepant from 
their presumed standard of correctness. Objective self awareness was varied 
by having some subjects facing a mirror with a television camera facing 
them, and by having some subjects seated away from the mirror while the 
camera faced away from them. Discrepancy reducing behaviour was pre-
vented by giving false feedback to the subjects on two relatively permanent 
dimensions, creativity and intelligence. Following the positive and negative 
feedback manipulation, subjects were seated at a table in a room either 
confronted with a mirror or not. Subjects were given the option of leaving the 
room at any point after five minutes had elapsed. The latency of the subjects 
leaving the room was used as a dependent measure. The results of the 
experiment supported the contention that the avoidance of a situation is a 
joint function of intra self discrepancy and the power of the situation to 
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evoke the objective state. The subjects in the high discrepancy condition 
avoided the situation to the degree that the were made objectively self aware. 
The mean number of minutes (6.39) spent in the room by high discrepancy 
subjects was less than the mean number of minutes spent in the room by 
subjects in the low discrepancy condition (7.80) [p < 0.5], thus supporting 
the hypothesis by Duval et al. (1971). 
Kihlstrom and Cantor (1984) proposed that the self concept is embed-
ded in a hierarchical system of social concepts and is represented much like 
other systems of knowledge about the social and non-social world. They 
regard self concepts as prototypes obstructed from self observations across 
various situations. The 'Self could be represented along with concepts for 
all the other people one knows as a highly specific, subordinate concept at 
the bottom of a hierarchy of person - types headed by the broadest concept 
'Person'. Alternatively instead of being grouped along with the others, the 
self may also be represented near the top of the hierarchy, with 'Person' 
branching out into 'Self versus 'Other', thus making a distinction between 
the self and other. The self may branch out into as many branches as are 
necessary to represent the multiplicity of selves. The self represents two 
forms of self knowledge : declarative knowledge, which includes autobio-
graphical memories and factual information about the self; and procedural 
knowledge, which includes information such as interaction skills, trait 
inference rules, and self presentational strategies. 
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It can be seen from the theories discussed above that an individual 
tries to maintain a stable self concept over time. However, it is obvious that 
we also change our ideas and attitudes about ourselves if the feedback we 
receive continuously points towards a different opinion. Over the years, 
psychologists have produced evidence that points both ways. Those who 
believe that the self concept is malleable derive their support from emperical 
studies which were performed under controlled laboratory conditions. 
Swann and Hill (1982) point out that an important distinction between 
laboratory studies and studies conducted in the field with regard to self 
concept change is that subjects are not given a chance to interact with others 
in order to verify his/her threatened self concept, as he/she would have done 
in a field setting. So,his self concepts do change, but only temporarily. There 
is substantial evidence in the psychological literature which 
supports the notion that the self concept is more or less stable, and that 
people strive to maintain their self-concept inspite of being exposed 
to conflicting feedback. 
Stability of tlie Self Concept : 
Kelly (1955) proposed that every individual forms a set of personal 
constructs by which they name and classify their past experiences. If an 
individual behaves in a manner that is in conformity with his set of unique 
personal constructs, then that person will experience harmony, but if his 
behaviour is incongruent with the constructs, then a discrepancy will de-
velop, which may result in either anxious or threatening consequences, or 
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guilt feelings in the individual. Kelly believes that an individual experiences 
anxiety when his construct system provides him with no means for dealing 
with such an experience - when he cannot place an important upcoming 
experience within his construct system. The only way the anxiety can be 
reduced is by developing new constructs that allow for conceptual control of 
the events of his life. By contrast, a person feels threatened when he senses 
an imminent change in his construct system - that is, when previously 
important constructs are no longer applicable to the system of the self. In 
such a situation the person is forced or compelled to change or modify his 
existing construct to one which is more in consonance with his experiences 
and changing values. Kelly also stated that sometimes it is not only the 
change in the environment which facilitates a change in constructs, but the 
behaviour of the individual itself does not live up to the standards set by his 
personal construct system. Such a person would experience a feeling of guilt 
and would try to reduce the discrepancy thus created by looking for 'ratio-
nalizations' which may disconfirm his errant behaviour and confirm his 
constructs. Thus, Kelly's personal construct theory states that an individual 
will be motivated to reduce his discrepancy if an experience, or behaviour, 
is incongruent with the individual's own personal construct system. 
To test his hypothesis regarding self - concept consistency, Kelly 
(1955) compared trait self descriptions obtained on questionnaires an-
swered almost 20 years apart. The questionnaires included the Allport -
Vernon scale of values and the Bernreuter personality test amongst others. 
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The consistency found for self concept ratings such as self confidence, 
sociability, personal interests and economic and political values, was in 
agreement with his hypothesis. 
Festinger's (1957) Cognitive Dissonance theory rests on the assump-
tion that the individual attempts to establish internal harmony, consistency 
or congruity amongst his opinions, attitudes, knowledge and value - what 
Festinger terms 'cognitive elements.' Inconsistent cognitions which are 
psychologically unpleasant motivate the individual to restore consistency. 
In other words, if a person receives feedback from an events or significant 
other which is not consistent with his existing self schemata, then the 
discrepancy between the feedback and the self concept becomes apparent, 
and as a result, the individual will experience unpleasantness. In such a 
situation, the individual will be motivated to reduce the discrepancy and the 
unpleasantness created by it. 
Aronson and Carlsmith (1962) reasoned that individuals are motivated 
to maintain consistent self concepts. They also predicted that even if a 
person develops a negative self-relevant performance expectancy, he will 
seek to maintain it. In a laboratory study, false feedback was given to subjects 
during a series of tests to establish either excellent or poor performance 
expectancies. Later on, a subsequent test was given to the subjects in which 
they were given false scores that either confirmed or disconfirmed their 
high result expectancies. The test was then performed again under the guise 
of elaborate instructions so that they may be allowed to alter their task 
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responses if they needed. The results indicated that those subjects who had 
been given information inconsistent with their expectancies changed more 
of their responses than did those who had obtained consistent information. 
Also, those who had expected to do badly but performed better seemed to 
exhibit more discomfort with their performance than did those whose nega-
tive expectations had been confirmed by a poor performance. 
Based on the assumption that persons tend to describe themselves in 
accordance with self conceptions, Gergen (1965) attempted to examine two 
components of social feedback - (i) that a person can be reinforced by others 
in order to produce certain behaviors at certain times by the method of 
operant conditioning (ii) that a person can learn toassociate his overt 
behaviour with discrepancies that are communicated to him by others could 
be possible. In a laboratory experiment during a 30 - minute interview, 
subjects were (a) either exposed to a type of social feedback called reflec-
tive reinforcement, or not exposed to such feedback, (b) presented this 
feedback in either a personal or impersonal manner, and (c) instructed either 
to be accurate about them selves, or to make a good impression. As predicted, 
the positive character of the self descriptions of the subject increased to a 
greater extent under feedback, than under conditions of no feedback, while 
those subjects who instructed to make a good impression demonstrated a 
greater increase inpositiveness than did the accurate subjects. However, as 
Swann and Hill (1982) have pointed out, such self concepts obtained in the 
laboratory are temporary, because once out of the laboratory and into the 
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field, the subject interacts with persons to reconfirm his previous self 
concept. 
Shrauger (1975) in a reviewof self consistency and self enhancement 
theories, stated that some dependent variable tend to produce consistency 
effects while others seemed to produce enhancements effects . Self consis-
tency theory assumes that people want others to treat them as a predictable 
manner, ie., in a manner that is consistent with their self concepts [for eg., 
Cooley, 1902; Adler, 1929; 1931 ; Mead ,1934; Allport, 1937 ;Bem, 1972]. 
Self enhancement theory, on the other hand, contends that people want 
others, to treat them in a positive manner in order to enhance their self, 
concepts [for eg., Rogers (1951); Combs and Snygg (1959), Duval and 
Wicklund,(l972)]. Shrauger states that although it may seem simple enough 
to test which theory can be discounted by examining the relevant responses 
of individuals to consistent or enhancing feedback, this is not the case. Both 
theoretical formulations predict that people with positive self views work to 
maintain such views, albeit for different reasons. However, both theories 
make contradictory predictions regarding negative self views. That is, self 
consistency theorists assume that individuals w ith negative self views prefer 
negative feedback because it is predictable; self enhancement theorists 
assume that such individuals prefer, positive feedback because they want to 
think well of themselves. Thus, Shrauger implicated in his review that 
although people with negative self views may find negative feedback 
cognitively valuable, they would also find it affectively abhorrent. Shrauger's 
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implication was subsequently empirically tested [see Swann et al., (1987) 
later in this review] and the result provided evidence for both the consistency 
and enhancement hypotheses. 
One way individuals may acquire self confirmatory feedback is by 
bringing their interaction partners to see them as they see themselves. In 
support of this hypothesis, Swann and Read (1981) engaged individuals who 
perceived themselves as likeable or dislikeable in getting - acquainted 
conversations. Prior to these conversations, some participants were led to 
suspect that their partner's appraisal confirmed their self concepts' others 
were led to believe that their partner's appraisal disconfirmed their self 
concept. Still others were given no clue regarding their partner's appraisal. 
In their subsequent interactions, individuals who perceived themselves as 
likable elicited more favorable reactions from their interaction partners 
than those who perceived themselves as dislikeable. This tendency was 
especially, pronounced when subjects suspected that their partner's apprais-
als might disconfirm their self concepts. 
Mortimer et al. (1982) examined the stability of the self concept as 
measured by a semantic differential scale. They obtained data from a panel 
of male college students over a period of 14 years by administering a 
semantic differential scale composed of 29 bipolar characteristics. The 
respondents were asked to rate "Myself as a person". The four different 
conceptualizations of developmental stability and change measured were 
structural invariance,and normative, level, and ipsative stability. The results 
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indicated that the multidimensional self concept is structurally invariant 
over the period of transition to adulthood, and both normati vely and ipsatively 
stable. In the same study, an attempt was made to investigate the relationship 
between self concept stability and life events. The life experiences of 
persons whose self competence had changed were compared with the expe-
riences of persons who remained relatively stable on this dimension after 
college. The objective and subjective life events that distinguished the 
groups were found to be predicted by the self competence dimension 
measured ten years earlier. The analysis also showed that the life experi-
ences significantly contributed to self concept development during the 
transition to adulthood. The evidence provided by this study suggest that a 
truly reciprocal relationship exists between life events and the enduring, yet 
changing, self image. 
Swann and Hill (1982) demonstrated that self concepts can be changed 
under experimental conditions. However, they also admitted that such a 
change remains for not more than a few days. Forty-six female under 
graduates completed a measure of self-perceived dominance and were 
accordingly divided into high and low dominance groups. Those who scored 
in the upper third of the distribution were called self dominants, and those 
scoring in the lower third were called self submissives. The subjects were 
then given either self consistent or self discrepant feedback by the experi-
menter. The data clearly indicated that when participants received discrepant 
rather than consistent feedback, they actively sought to reject and refute it, 
while self consistent feedback was accepted by the subjects. But when the 
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participants did not get a chance to interact with the source of feedback, then 
it was found that self discrepant feedback produced more self rating change 
than self, consistent feedback. Swann and Hill concluded that although 
change in theself concept is easy to produce in the laboratory, these changes 
are short lived. Swann and Hill stated that intrapersonal as well as interper-
sonal changes must take place for a change in the self concept. At the 
intrapersonal level, the individuals must realize that they are not the persons 
they once believed they were. At the interpersonal level it is necessary that 
the significant others in the individual's life must validate and legitimize his/ 
her self view. Thus, changes in the self concept will be lasting only when 
there is a corresponding shift in the individuals social environment. The 
process of self concept change will be complete only after people engage 
themselves in a social environment that gives them the chance to sustain the 
new self concept. 
Some researchers argue that although a stable self concept is necessary 
for good mental health, the self concept cannot remain stable while respond-
ing to dramatic life events or systematic interventions . In a study that has 
relevance to this dilemma,Marsh, Smith, Barnes and Butler, (1983), exam-
ined changes in multidimensional self concepts of preadolescent children. 
First, their research identified multiple facets of self concept and showed 
that these facets were systematically related to the self concepts inferred by 
teachers and to academic achievement indicators. Secondly, they found that 
the facets of self concept were relatively stable, even for young children. 
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Third, they found that changes in self concept that did occur were reliable and 
systematic. Finally, their results suggested that changes in self concept were 
multidimensional, such that changes were specific to only particular dimen-
sions of the self concept rather than generalizing across all dimensions. 
They thus suggested that it is possible for a dramatic life event to have at least 
a moderate effect on a particular facet of the self concept rather them on the 
whole self concept. From the findings of Marsh et al., it may be suggested 
that the self concept may experience a simultaneous change in certain facet, 
while remaining relatively stable at the same time. 
Diener and Larsen (1984) examined the consistency and stability of 
feelings of individuals in reports that were completed on 3,512 occasions 
randomly sampled from the lives of 42 subjects. The stabilit>' and consis-
tency of responses depended upon the situations, individuals, and responses 
involved. The results revealed that high degrees of consistency were unusual 
for single responses, although mean levels of responding tended to be both 
highly stable and consistent. Persons who were more consistent across a pair 
of situations tended to be more consistent across other situational pairs. 
Swann et al .(1987) tested the hypothesis that people's cognitive 
responses conform to self- consistency theory and their affective responses 
conform to self - enhancement theory. Specifically, they anticipated that 
cognitive reactions would be based on the degree to which the feedback 
confirmed the participants self views. In contrast, they expected that affec-
tive reactions would be based on the favourability of the feedback, with 
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favourable feedback producing more positive mood states than unfavorable 
feedback. One hundred and six undergraduates who possessed either posi-
tive or negative self - concepts, were presented with either favourable or 
unfavourable social feedback. The subjects' cognitive reactions to the feed-
back were measured on four dimensions (perceived competence of the 
evaluator, perceived accuracy of the feedback, perceived diagnosticity of the 
rating technique and participants' attributions regarding the feedback) and 
affective reactions were assessed with a measurement of mood [Zuckerman 
and Lubin's (1965) Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (MAACL)], to 
measure depression, anxiety and hostility. Simple effect analyses indicated 
that positive self concept individuals who received favourable feedback 
regarded it as more accurate [F(l,39)= 122.60; p< .001], the rater as more 
competent [F = (1,38) = 93.77, p < .001], and the technique as more 
diagnostic [F = (1,38) = 21.56, p< .001]. Negative self concept individuals 
displayed precisely the opposite tendency - i.e., such individuals who re-
ceived unfavorable feedback regarded it as particularly accurate [F (1,56^ 
= 12.77), p<.001] andtheevaluator as particularly competent [F(l,56) = 
6.26, p < .02]. These data support the hypothesis that people's cognitive 
reactions to feedback are driven by a concern with the consistency of the 
feedback to their self conceptions. 
Regarding affective reactions to the feedback, the data supported the 
hypothesis that positive and negative self concept individuals alike would 
feel better after receiving favourable feedback as compared to unfavourable 
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feedback. Data indicated that participants who received unfavourable as 
compared to favourable feedback were more depressed [F (1,92) = 15.41; p 
< .001], hostile [F (1,92) 8.81, p < .004] and anxious [F (1,92) - 11.97, 
p < .001]. Moreover the factor analysis indicated that (a) the cognitive 
measures were closely related with one another but were relatively indepen-
dent of the affective measures. 
The studies mentioned above suggest that the self concept is rela-
tively stable over time, and at the same time, is susceptible to change when 
life events or incidents which are intense enough to alter a facet of the self 
concept take place.To understand the stability of the self concept across 
time, it is important to understand the underlying memory processes that 
help in processing, and storing information and retrieving of self relevant 
information. The following studies support the notion that people store and 
recall information that is consistent with their self concept in an organized 
manner, and that individuals try to obtain self confirmatory information from 
the social environment around them. 
Self Schemata and Information Processing in Memory t 
One concept central to memory theory is that memory as a process, is 
constructive in nature, and not faithfully reproductive. Bartlett (1932) was 
one of the first psychologists who emphasized the constructive nature of 
memory.He introduced the term 'schemata' and described it as a hypotheti-
cal, complex, internal organization of the past reactions and experiences 
about the world, which are centered around a few basic attitudes or concepts. 
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Bartlett also maintained that the mind consists of schemata about the world, 
rather than traces or images of the world. What endures in memory, then, are 
attitudes regarding past events rather than just a heavy loading of factual 
information.The factual information meshes with the attitude which then 
emerges at the time of recall. 
Referring to his experiments on memory, Bartlett (1932) wrote, "In 
the many thousands of cases of memory which 1 have collected, literal recall 
was very rare .... In fact, if we consider the evidence, remembering appears 
to be far more decisively an affair of construction rather than one of 
reproduction"(pl(^e conducted numerous experiments or remembering by 
the method of what he called the method of serial reproduction. Bartlett 
obtained chained reproductions of folk stories, descriptive and argumenta-
tive prose passages, and picture material. In this method, the original mate-
rial was shown to A, who reproduced the given stimulus maternal from 
memory. This reproduction was given to B, who in turn reproduced it from 
memory. In such a manner, the reproduced material was passed on from 
subject to subject, and each subject was instructed to reproduce from 
memory the portrait he had been shown, after a suitable time interval of 15-
30 minutes. The results indicated that human memory is exceedingly subject 
to errors and that the individual adds certain other details from his memory 
to make a picture, thus reconstructing from memory the portrait he had been 
shown. 
The concept of schemata in memory led to much research which 
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revealed that information regarding the self is processed into memory more 
quickly than information which is not self related. Cantor and Mischel 
(1977) showed subjects a series of statements describing an introvert 
(along with some other neutral statement). The subjects were then shown a 
list of items and asked to indicate whether each item had been in the first 
series of statements. These subjects showed a consistent bias to identify 
highly introvert related -items as having been in the first series, when in 
reality, they had not been in the first series. The data indicated that the 
subjects had abstracted the concept of 'introvert' during the initial list 
presentation and used this abstraction as a reference during the identifica-
tion task. This abstraction represents a schema, and the data clearly reflects 
a tendency of bias in the case of self - related information. 
Markus( 1977) was the first to introduce a 'schema' model of the self 
concept. According to Markus, information about the self is organised as 
cognitive structures referred to as self schemata. A self schema is a 
generalisation that develops as a result of past experience, and is used in 
subsequent processing of self relevant information. In an experiment, Markus 
(1977) tested the hypothesis that self schemata have consequences for the 
processing of self relevant information by comparing female undergradu-
ates with and without self schemata with respect to dependence / indepen-
dence. The presence or absence of this self schemata was estimated from 
three converging sources - self ratings on this dimension (dependence -
independence), ratings of the importance of this dimension for the subjects, 
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and checking 'dependent' or 'independent' on a^adjective checklist. Markus 
then demonstrated that subjects who had dependent schemata processed 
information related to dependence - independence differently from subjects 
with independent schemata. For example, in a reaction - time experiment, 
dependent subjects were faster to decide whether dependent traits were self 
- relevant as compared to independent traits. The reverse pattern of reaction 
time was obtained for independent subjects. For a third group of aschematics, 
no difference was found for both traits. 
In a similar light, Roger, Kuiper and Kirker (1977) examined the 
relative strength of self reference as an encoding device. Subjects were 
presented with words for which they were required to make yes or no 
judgments for each word - 'yes ' if the word described the subject, 'no' if it 
did not. The strength of the memory trace for personal adjectives was 
assessed using an incidental recall task after the ratings were completed. 
Recall was found to be better for words that were accompanied by the 
question, "Does this word describe you ?" in comparison with words accom-
panied by the question, "Does this word mean the same as honest ?" the 
results revealed a clear superiority of recall for self referent words. This 
finding was interpreted by Rogers et al., that the self produces strong and 
elaborate memory traces, and in turn was offered as support for the self as 
a schema. 
Bower and Gilligan (1979) also found that relating a word to the 
concept of one's own self resulted in better recall than did relating a word 
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to the concept of some other less well known person .They presented trait 
words to subjects in two conditions :in condition I, subjects were asked to 
think of a personal experience which exemplified the trait presented, while 
in condition II, they were asked to decide whether the trait adjective was 
descriptive of themselves or not. The results revealed that recall in both 
conditions was the same. In addition Bower and Gilligan found that nineout 
often subjects in the II condition thought of a specific autobiographical 
incident to support or refute a trait as self descriptive. This result implied 
that subjects used their memory of personal episodes while making self 
reference judgments. On the basis of the experimental results, Bower and 
Gilligan proposed that good memory depends upon relating the presented 
words to a well defined structure, and in the self reference task, the concept 
of the self is such a well defined structure. 
Hull and Levy (1979) proposed a model of self awareness that defines 
the essential functions of self awareness in terms of the cognitive organisation 
or encoding of information according to its self- relevance. Specifically, 
they proposed that self awareness aids encoding information that is related 
to the self, and thus, is more responsive to the self relevant aspects of the 
environment. In addition, they also proposed that information about past 
performances and present physiological states also constitutes self relevant 
information as long as it specifies a relationship between self and environ-
ment. Hull and Levy presented three experiments in support of their model. 
The first experiment used an incidental memory paradigm to demonstrate 
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that self awareness is associated with a particular encoding depth. The 
remaining two experiments demonstrated that self - criticism and self -
attributions are not only characteristic of self awareness 
alone, but rather depend on aspects of the immediate situation. The 
results revealed that self awareness is a result of a particular form of 
informational encoding rather than just the attentional activation of a 
self evaluative process. 
Kuiper & Rogers (1979) in a series of five experiments , examined 
whether there were any differences between the processing of information 
about the self and the processing of information for others. The purpose of 
this series of experiments was to clarify the nature of self and other referent 
processing of personal data in an attempt to better understand the cognitive 
structures involved in processing information about people. Undergraduate 
subjects were asked to make self - referent ('describes you?') or other -
referent ('describes, experimenter?') ratings of personal adjectives. Results 
from the five experiments indicated that self ratings were consistently 
judged as easier to make, and subjects always placed more confidence in 
these judgments. An analysis of rating times (RT's) showed that only adjec-
tives with long rating times were recalled for the unknown other referent 
task. In contrast, the recalled words for the self referent task 
had very short rating times. This difference was explained by Kuiper 
and Rogers by a "two - process" interpretation, whereby unknown -
other - referent processing involves the self as a highly organised 
and efficient schema. 
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Ferguson, Rule and Carlson (1983) examined whether evaluation was 
an important dimension underlying the influence of a well organised sche-
mata on the encoding and retrieval of personally relevant information. 
Participants were asked to decide whether the positive or negative trait 
adjectives presented to them (a) described themselves, a well liked ,disliked, 
or neutral person, or (b) were desirable, imaginable, meaningful, or familiar. 
The results indicated that better memory was found for trait adjectives rated 
for their descriptiveness of the self and for well - liked others (eg., friends, 
parents) than for their descriptiveness of people towards when subjects may 
have felt relatively indifferent. 
Bellezza (1984) examined the hypothesis that the self-reference 
effect occurs because the self provides a set of organised internal cues in the 
form of personal experiences that can mediate recall; and that constructibility 
and associability of internal cues are also important for recalling self 
relevant material. 
In experiment number 1, subjects were presented with likeable and 
unlikeable trait words, and then had to relate each word to a personal 
experience. In the body condition, subjects had to relate each presented trait 
word to a part of their body. The personal experience condition represented 
the self and the body condition represented the external self. It was 
hypothesised that since trait words are more representative of personal 
experiences than of body parts, they will be easily associated with personal 
experiences than with body parts. Subjects used a five-point rating scale to 
indicate how easy it was to relate each presented trait word to a personal 
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experience or to body parts. The results indicated that trait words were easier 
to associate with personal experiences, but since body parts could be better 
remembered them self experiences as internalcues, body parts were more 
easy to recall (Bellezza, 1981). 
In experiment 2, concrete nouns were presented rather than trait 
words to see whether there was any difference when items other than trait 
words were presented. They stated that if the hypothesis that only trait words 
are differentially processed by the self schema, then the associability of 
personal experiences and body parts with respect to concrete nouns should 
be similar. Results revealed that the recall of concrete nouns was approxi-
mately equal in both the experience and body part conditions; however, the 
subjects were able to relate the presented nouns to personal experiences 
more easily than to the body parts. This greater associability, however, was 
offset by the finding that reliability of retrieval (constructibility) of the 
body parts was greater (.73 as compared to .54 for personal experiences). 
The higher associability of personal experiences was balanced by their lower 
constructibility, so that recall in both conditions was virtually the same. 
Bellazza concluded that mnemonic properties of the internal cues (ie., 
constructibility and associability) are important for self reference, and that 
these properties can vary independently according to the learning task and 
the materials used. 
The ideal self has also been described as a schema. Deutsch et al., 
(1988) used a spontaneous trait - generation task whereby subjects rated the 
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degree of self - descriptiveness of frequently endorsed ideal and self traits. 
The words were presented tachistoscopically, and reaction times (RT's) were 
calculated on judgements of self descriptiveness. The results showed that 
although the highest self descriptive ratings were for the self traits, ideal 
traits had higher ratings than a list of random traits. Furthermore, RT's for 
endorsement of ideal and self traits did not differ; however, both were 
endorsed faster than a list of random traits or traits endorsed by matched 
controls. Thus, the enhanced processing of ideal traits supports the sche-
matic representation of the ideal self and suggests that the ideal self is an 
elaborate part of the self. 
Greenwald and Banaji (1989) provided a research model of the pro-
cess by which personal and social knowledge serves as a nucleus around 
which new knowledge is easily accumulated. In four experiments, subjects 
were first made to produce friends names and then were asked to constructed 
sentences, each including a name together with an assigned (target) noun. 
Unexpected recall tests showed greater, superior memory for target nouns 
used in sentences with own friends' (self generated) names as compared to 
nouns used in sentences with others' friends' (other - generated) names. 
This self- generation effect was observed across several procedural varia-
tions. Computer analysis of experiments 3 and 4 supported the assumption 
that the effect the procedure of self generation on free recall of target nouns 
is mediated by retrieval of self - generated names with which the menns are 
sentence - paired. The cumulative results indicate that power mnemonic 
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effects associated with the self can be understood in terms of familiar, 
ordinary memory processes. In short, the self is a unique, cognitive structure 
having extraordinary memories capabilities, on the other hand, the self is 
also an ordinary knowledge structure, although it may have some memory 
favoring properties in a large degree. 
Early Memories ; 
Freud (1899 / 1950) was one of the first to mention early memories 
(EM's) and he termed them 'screen memories' to refer to what is remem-
bered after the main event is repressed. He regarded EM s as a result of 
infantile amnesia which fall under a 'shroud of oblivion' by repression. The 
final results which emerges, according to Freud, are distorted and disguised 
memories called screen memories. Freud discovered that the latent meaning 
of such memories could be brought out by the method of free association, 
and that once the distortions and displacement of the memory are analysed, 
one will discover the memory of an actual occurrence. Thus, Freudians view 
EMs as a product which is retrieved in the future. According to Freudians, 
the first 6 to 8 years of life determine the individuals future course of life 
and thus EMs are very important in order to understand personality function-
ing . 
Adler (1937) believed that the function of EMs is to serve as a guide, 
a source of inspiration, or as a warning for tackling future experiences and 
that the manifest content of early recollections can be analysed to reveal the 
life style adapted by the individual in the present. He stated that EM s are 
retained due to a selective factor in memory - the individual will retain and 
52 
recall only those memories that fit into his present lifestyle and which is 
consistent with the industrialize frame of reference. Adler viewed the EM as 
a means by which the individual evaluates himself and his current self. Thus, 
a change in the recall of EM's may indicate a change in the lifestyle of the 
individual. This is due to reconstruction of the event in memory in order to 
fit the person's present perceptual framework. 
Dudycha and Dudycha (193 3; 1941) were amongst the early psycholo-
gists to conduct extensive studies to determine the manifest features of 
EM's. Dudycha and Dudycha (1933) asked subjects to record their earliest 
memories. They then interviewed each subject extensively, to try and obtain 
as accurate a date for the memory as possible, using a list of possible clues 
for help. They also asked subjects to consult parents or others involved in the 
events to try to ascertain the date. The results revealed that females had 
earlier memories than males. Dudycha and Dudycha also examined the 
relationship of emotions to EM's. In a carefully controlled study which 
analysed 233 memories, they found that a variety of emotions accompanied 
EM's, most prominent amongst which were fear (30.4%), joy (27.9%), anger 
(10.3%), ,wonder and curiosity (8.1%), pain(5.2%), shame and guilt (2.6%) 
and miscellaneous emotions (3.8%). Memories having no emotion were 
only 5.2%. Dudycha and Dudycha (1941) also reviewed the EM literature 
and found that pleasant memories were recalled more than unpleasant memo-
ries. 
53 
There may be certain periods in one's life when experiences will have 
a more profound impact on the psyche of the individual. This view was put 
forth by Pressey and Kuhlen (1957) who felt that certain critical periods may 
trigger off more intense emotion responses from the person. They put 
forward a 'critical hypothesis' saying that there are certain critical periods 
when the experiences will have a more serious outcome and far-reaching 
impact. They are of the view that habit patterns and personality, including 
patterns of emotional responses become more rigid with increasing age 
thereby becoming more resistant to emotional experiences. Thus, according 
to the critical hypothesis, emotional experiences would have a stronger 
impact psychologically, especially when the person is young - ie., the 
younger the individual, the more constructive or damaging the experience 
may be. Thus, the EMs of a child can be expected to be more emotionally and 
psychologically damaging than adult EM's and it may also be assumed in light 
of the critical hypothesis that experiences in childhood, especially emotion-
ally fulfilling or damaging ones, would play a definite role in shaping the 
personality of the individual; EMs may thus became important if one wishes 
to know about the self. 
Bruhn (1981) provided a theoretical explanation regarding children's 
EMs. He believed that apart from adults EMs, children's earliest recollec-
tions can be used to predict their present behaviour. Bruhn used the Zeigarnik 
effect to explain that a child's unfinished business, which is age appropriate, 
might function in order to keep into awareness those memories which 
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illustrate the children's most pressing and immediate concerns. Bruhn ex-
plained that a 'time capsule' functions for every individual may wish to 
preserve only those events which best reflect his/her present construction of 
life and its meaning to the child. He feels that EMs are retained for one or 
more of the following reasons : (i) for the inspiration they provide; (ii) for 
their ability to portray the essence of life as experienced by the child (iii) 
they reflect the child's view of himself/herself, others, or his or her philoso-
phy of life, (iv) EMs are emotionally charged and imply that life will never 
be the same afterwards. Such memories are clinically rich, and have great 
diagnostic value, a point refuted by Adlerians. 
Bruhn (1981) presented a case study of a 9 year old girl, Audrey, who 
had mild depression and was a school failure. An only child, she had been 
living alone with her mother since about age 5. Like here mother, she had few 
friends and was shy and withdrawn. She was separated from her mother for 
the past two months due to her mother's admittance in a hospital for an 
operation. Her three EMs revealed a sense of loss / deprivation (related to 
her father), a hostile - dependent relationship with here mother, and a need 
for protection from here unavailable father (Audrey's parents were separated 
since she was 5 years old). She was diagnosed by Bruhn as having a hysterical 
personality structure. He concluded his study by saying that (i) EM data can 
be used alone to determine major intra and inter personal dynamics of the 
child, and in many cases EMs provide the major focus of treatment since the 
child's personal world or life style is reflected in the EM. (ii) Clinically 
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useful EM material can be better collected from older children, since the 
time interval is greater for older children and they may be able to recall 
better developed EMs. 
Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz (1982) conducted a survey of earliest 
memory using a more adequate means of assessment. They required subjects 
to recall the earliest memory they could think of. Two sets of subjects, high 
school students and college students were included in the study. Subjects of 
both samples completed an Earliest Memory Questionnaire (EMQ). They 
were then asked to complete a written inquiry containing scales that con-
cerned (i) their age at the time of the memory, (ii) frequency of prior 
recollection of the event (iii) clarity of the event (iv) the feeling involved in 
the memory; (v) a more specific statement of the emotion associated with 
the memory in then own words; (vi) the sensory modalities involved in the 
memory image (visual / auditory / tactile / olefactory / gustatory / kines-
thetic); (vii) whether the subject saw the visual image (if any) in black and 
white, or color, and (viii) if he saw himself with other people in the visual 
image (if any). The college subjects also completed the Personality Re-
search Form (Form AA) which consists of 20 content scales measuring trait 
constructs derived from Murray's conception of human needs plus validity 
scales. Because of the close association between EMs and anxiety in, several 
theories, the construct 'Harm avoidance' was of particular interest. The 
high-school sample did not complete the PRF but were given the EMQ along 
with the college students three months later in which they had to write down 
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their earliest memory, regardless of whether it was the same as before or not. 
Results revealed that the modal age for the EM of college students was 3 
years, and 4 years for the high school students. A significant difference was 
found between the two sample groups [t = (311) = 5.70, p< .001, 2 tailed)]. 
Clarity of memory was found to be 74.3% for college students and 72.5% for 
high school subjects in the modeiately clear category, and visual imagery 
was most prominent in both the groups. More than 90% in each sample 
reported that the memory had been recalled occasionally prior to the testing 
session. Based on inter-rater agreement, more memories were classified as 
traumatic in the high-school sample than the college sample [X^ (2) = 15.22; 
p < .001]. The ratio of unpleasant memories to the total memories for both 
samples combined was roughly 1 : 3. Also, it was found that 58.1% of 
subjects recalled the same memory on the second trial, thus employing a 
fairly good consistency in recall, while 41.9% recalled a different memory. 
For the subjects who recalled the same memory, the age and affect in the 
memory was found to be highly reliable (r = ,94 and .83 
for college and high school students respectively). Ratings of clarity 
(r= .49), frequency of prior recall (r = .56) and number of sensory 
modalities involved (r = .59) had all significantly high correlations (all p < 
.001). Thus, in Kihlstrom's and Harackiewicz's (1982) systematic detailed 
study of EMs, the surface features of early recollections were found to be 
parallel in research with Dudycha and Dudycha"s( 1941) findings. 
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Dudycha and Dudy cha 's (1941) findings. 
Bruh n and Bellow (1984) proposed a cognitive perceptual method as 
a theoretical framework for understanding and interpreting EMs. They 
pointed out that a perception aims at a general impression rather than a 
detailed picture of the whole, a point made in 1932 by Bartlett. This 
selectivity of perception is due to the various needs, fears, major beliefs, 
attitude and interests of the individual which help and guide him/her in 
reconstructing his events into memories.The individual's frame of reference 
operates in present time to accommodate the new experiences which are not 
present in memory at that time. Thus, schemata may be revised from time to 
time in the light of new information. Thus, while recalling an event, a 
person's process of justification helps the persons attitudes and beliefs 
mesh with the factual information to produce a reconstructed event.Bruhn 
and Bellow thus explained EMs in terms of a cognitive-perceptual feedback 
loop in which the individual's perception of the w orld is held to be constant 
unless the individual is confronted with events powerful enough to make a 
lasting psychological impact so that his schemata of the world changes to 
accommodate the new experience(s)and attitudes, needs, and major beliefs 
that come with it. 
Shortly after conceptualization of the cognitive perceptual model 
Bruhn (1985) proposed that EMs could be used as a projective device. He 
extended the cognitive perceptual theory to include axioms and affect in 
relation to EMs that an individual has reached about himself, others, or the 
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world around him' (p. 588). An understanding of the basic axioms of an 
individual's self concept can help in diagnosing specific behavioural prob-
lems. Bruhn gives an example of a young man, who, although of marriageable 
age, seemed uninterested in women, and used to wonder why it was so. His 
earliest memory, which was examined by Bruhn, was of his mother scolding 
him and his brother harshly over a trivial matter. After sometime when he 
could bear it no longer, he broke down and confessed to his mother that he 
was wrong just to escape her critical and harsh behaviour. Bruhn diagnosed 
that this man's axiom as revealed in the EM was that: women are hypercriti-
cal, abusive and castrating. By avoiding women and a committed relationship 
with them, he could avoid his male ego and feeling and humiliated . 
Bruhn (1981) also cited the importance of affect and distinguished 
between positive and negative affect and their respective functions. He felt 
that EM's with positive affect serve defensive functions (eg, to avoid painful 
issues, to ward off depressive affect) or reflect the presence of strong needs, 
especially when they appear at the beginning or end of an EM. Negative 
affect, an or "unfinished business" that causes the remembering of the EM -
when the individuals goal has been blocked a tension to complete the action 
and fulfill the goal remains, permitting the EM tosurface till the goal is 
fulfilled. In order to recognize whether the EM is positively or negatively 
toned, Bruhn proposed the following guidelines : 
(i) A positive EM has the following characteristics : 
(a) the focus is on a positive interaction with another person. 
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(b) a problem or obstacle revealed early in the memory is resolved at 
the end; 
(c) the afterthought following the recollection of a generally negative 
EM reflects learning, an increase a coping skills, or increased 
determination. 
(ii) A negative EM can be detected if it contains : 
(a) destructive interaction with another person that is not favourably 
resolved; 
(b) failed mastery experience; 
(c) a loss, occurring as a death, or shifting residence; 
(d) avoidance response to a stressful situation; 
(e) bad judgment of the situation or defects in reality testing; 
(f) indication of significant problems with impulse control. 
Bruhn concluded that EMs thus can be used as a powerful protective 
technique to recall much about individuals selves; how individuals will 
respond to future events can also be predicted by analyzing their experiences 
of the past, especially the earliest recollection. 
Davidow and Bruhn (1990) investigated whether thematic data ob-
tained from EMs could be used to differentiate delinquents from non delin-
quents. In a study, 71 middle class delinquent males (mean age 16.34 yrs) and 
71 middle class non delinquent males (mean age, used as a control group) 
were first paired closely for SES, vocabulary ,and age. During a 20-minute 
interview which was tape recorded, subjects were asked to recall their 
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of the memory; (iii) the clearest part of the memory; (iv) the feelings 
experienced at the time of the event in the memory; (v) a one - word overall 
description of the memory. After the interview was over, the subject was 
given a sheet with scale that ranged from very unpleasant (1) to very pleasant 
(5) with neutral in between (3). Affect scores were obtained by asking the 
subject to rate each memory on the 5-point scale. The content categories 
used to differentiate both groups successfully classified 81.7% of subjects 
in the experiment group as delinquent and 95.8% of subjects in the control 
group as non-delinquents. The EMs of delinquent subjects reflected antiso-
cial behaviour - for example, when serious rule - breaking occurred, 95% of 
the delinquents were responsible for it; if a fire was set, 100% of the 
delinquents were responsible. Delinquents also recalled more memories 
involving injuries of illnesses (40%), failed mastery tasks (71%), recalled 
being alone in unpleasant situations (91.4%). Non-delinquents recalled 
more EMs involving successfully completing mastery tasks (63%), recalled 
being alone in pleasant situations (64%), and being more sensitive to other 
feelings (55%). The results also indicated that delinquents recalled more 
negative affect in their EMs and more unpleasant events than non-delin-
quents, who recalled more pleasant events with positive affect. The results 
were in consonance with Bruhn and Bellow's cognitive perceptual theory and 
replicated the findings of Bruhn and Davidow (1984). 
Muellen (1994) suggested that the development of autobiographical 
recollection is shaped by a child's participation in discussing events with 
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parents and other adults. He believed that demographic variables related to 
the nature of linguistic environments might be associated with differences 
in the development of autobiographical recollection. Muellen conducted 
four studies on a number of Caucasian, Asian, Asian American, and Korean 
students, using questionnaires which asked questions pertaining to (i) sex, 
(ii) year of birth, (iii) ethnicity, (iv) number of siblings (v) birth order, (vi) 
members of household when the subject was under 8 years of age (vii) parents 
employment when subject was under the age of 8; (viii) age of earliest 
memory. Results showed that the age of EM increases across birth order, is 
slightly early for females than males, and is earlier for Caucasian than 
Asians. The average age of EMs reported by Koreans was later them both 
Caucasians and Asians. Muellen explained this difference in terms of the 
influence of neural maturation, cognitive development, the socio - linguistic 
environment of the individual, the development of a sense of self, and the 
personal salience of the particular experience one has. By conversing about 
their past experiences with adults, children learn how to recall experiences 
and thus their memories can be said to be co-constructed. 
Thorne (1995) examined whether retrospective accounts of person-
ally important specific encounters will indicate developmentally reasonable 
changes in social contexts and motivations. Ninety five subjects who had 
been included in a longitudinal study of personality since they were three 
years of age, in the year 1969-1970, were recruited for Thome's study. The 
sample was heterogeneous with respect to ethnicity, social class, and parent 
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education. About two - thirds of the subjects were European American, with 
about one quarter African - Americans and a small percentage of Asian 
Americans, Hispanics and native Americans. During an intensive personal 
interview, ten memories were collected by the method of free recall. Probing 
was kept to a minimum to facilitate the free flow of the narration. However, 
whenever an essential piece of information was omitted by the subject (eg. 
age of subject; relationship of person involved) the interviewer intervened. 
The events ranged from childhood to adulthood, and then some specific 
memories - such as earliest memory, memory of mother, father; memory of 
feeling guilty / ashamed, etc. were obtained from the subject. The memories 
were then coded using a self - made coding system, whose inter judge 
agreement was moderately high (ie., 77% across nearly 200 memories). The 
interviews together yielded a total of 1,544 codeable memories. The results 
indicated that memories about wanting help and about parents were more 
likely to occur in childhood, while memories about wanting to help, to love 
and about close friends were more likely to prevail by mid to late adoles-
cence. Male subjects' early memories primarily contained episodes of 
wanting help from parents, whereas female subjects recalled memories that 
had an equal number of wishes for help and wishesfor love, and an even 
greater prevalence of childhood memories about close friends. This differ-
ence was attributed by Thorne as reflecting early gender differences. Around 
age 3, boys begin to play in relatively large groups and girls in smaller groups, 
thus insulating themselves from the intrusion of others. The greater preva-
lence of close friends and the need for intimacy in the EMs of women may 
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reflect such early gender differences. Thome concluded by stating that some 
central features of individuals past memories show developmentally reason-
able changes. 
Self Discrepancy Theory And Possible Reasons For Discrepancy : 
The studies reviewed above by now adequately provide evidence to the 
effect that discrepancies may develop due to inconsistent feedback about the 
self, and that recalled life experiences, especially EMs, may help indicate the 
discrepancy prevalent in the individual. A discrepancy occurs when a differ-
ence is observed between the actual self (also known more popularly as the 
self concept) and a goal or standard set by the individual for himself. 
Although several theoretical conceptualizations of the self have been de-
scribed in the reviewed literature, two self standards have acquired promi-
nence in the recent years due to their perceived applicability in empirical 
study and common acceptance by theorists and psychologists alike. One 
' self most widely studied is the ideal self, and the other, less popular but of 
equal importance, is the ought-self, introduced by Higgins (1987) in his Self 
Discrepancy theory. Since the present study has adopted Higgins methods of 
measuring the self discrepancy of individuals, the theory and supporting 
evidence for it will be reviewed below. This will be followed by supporting 
evidence regarding other related factors which have been analysed in the 
present study, such as the behavioural impact of significant others on the 
individual, the impact of positive and negative experiences and its relation 
with discrepancy, the emotions recalled (and expected to be recalled) by high 
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low discrepancy individuals,the overall affect of the recalled events, and the 
nature of outcome of the recalled event. 
Higgins Self Discrepancy Theory (1987) : 
Self Discrepancy Theory distinguishes between two basic types of 
guiding end states: (a) ideal self guides, which are individuals' representa-
tions of someone's (self or other) hopes, wishes, or aspirations for them, and 
(b) ought self guides, which are individuals representations of someone's 
(self or other) demands regarding their duties, obligations, and responsibili-
ties. The theory postulates that the ideal - self regulatory system focuses on 
the presence or absence of positive outcomes (eg, love provided or with-
drawn) whereas the ought self regulatory system focuses on the presence or 
absence of negative outcomes (eg, criticism administered or suspended). 
Thus, sensitivity to events involving the presence or absence of positive 
outcomes should be greater when ideal Vs. ought self guides 
are activated, whereas sensitivity to events involving the absence or pres-
ence of negative outcomes should be greater for ideal discrepancy subjects 
when idealvsoughtself guides are activated,where as sensitivity to events 
involving the absence or presence of negative outcomes should be greater 
for ought discrepancy subjects when ought vs.ideal self guides are activated. 
Higgins Self Discrepancy theory also postulates that ideal discrep-
ancy holders will be susceptible to emotions that are related to dejection 
(eg., disappointment, dissatisfaction, depressed, embarrassment, shame, 
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etc.), while a person having an ought discrepancy will be susceptible to 
emotions related to agitation - for eg., guilt, anxiety, uneasiness, fear, and 
feeling threatened. 
In a direct test of self discrepancy theory, Higgins et al,(1986) 
examined whether the type of emotional change experienced by individuals 
is influenced by the availability and accessibility of the different types of 
self discrepancies they possess. Two studies were conducted. In both studies, 
subjects filled out a measure of self discrepancy (Selves questionnaire; 
Higgins, Klein and Strauman,1985) a few weeks prior to the experimental 
session. In the questionnaire, subjects were asked to list upto 10 attributes 
each for different self states - their actual self (self concept), their ideal self 
and their ought self. The availability or magnitude of the discrepancy was 
calculated by comparing the attributes in the actual self to the attributes in 
each of the self states independently, with the total number of attribute pairs 
that matched (synonymous to one another) being subtracted from the total 
number of attribute pairs that. In study 1, subjects were then asked to imagine 
either a positive event or a negative event and were then given a mood 
measure and a writing speed task. Results indicated that subjects with a 
predominant actual: ideal discrepancy felt more dejected (eg. sad) and wrote 
more slowly in the negative event condition than in the positive event 
condition, whereas subjects with a predominant actual: ought discrepancy 
felt more agitated (eg., afraid) and wrote more quickly in the negative event 
condition. In study 2, subject were selected who were either high in both 
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kinds of discrepancies, or low in both. Half of the subjects in each group 
were asked to discuss their own and their parents goals and hopes for them 
(ideal priming) and the other half were asked to describe their own and their 
parents beliefs concerning their duty and obligations (ought priming). The 
results revealed that for high discrepancy subjects,( but not for discrepancy 
subjects), ideal priming increased their dejection ,while ought priming 
increased their agitation. The implication of these findings suggest that the 
psychological situation represented by a self discrepancy can be sufficiently 
accessible to be used in interpreting past, present, or even future events, 
either by frequent activation that may lead to a chronic accessibility (Higgins 
et al., 1982) or by contextual priming that temporarily increases its acces-
sibility. The former is an internal factor, and the latter an external one, and 
together they would produce the emotional symptoms associated with the 
psychological situation represented by the self discrepancy. 
To test the hypothesis that ideal discrepancy individuals focus on the 
presence or absence of positive outcomes while ought discrepancy individu-
als focus on the presence of negative outcomes of events, Higgins and 
Tyk9scinski (1992) selected predominant actual: ideal discrepancy subjects 
(high and low discrepancies) and predominant actual : ought discrepancy 
subjects. A few weeks after the selection procedure, the subjects were given 
the same essay about the life of a target person in which different events 
reflecting each of the four different types of psychological situations 
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curred (eg. the presence of a positive outcome). The target person's experi-
ences were circumstantial and not personality related. Ten minutes after 
reading the essay, the subjects were asked to reproduce it word by word. As 
predicted, events reflecting either the presence or absence of positive 
outcomes were remembered better by predominant actual : ideal than by 
predominant actual: ought discrepancy subjects, while the reverse was true 
for events reflecting the presence or absence of negative outcomes. The 
results of this study support the notion that ideal discrepancy predominant 
subjects are oriented towards positive outcomes, while ought discrepancy 
subjects are oriented towards negative outcomes of events. 
According to Higgins theory, the possible reason why self discrepan-
cies occur and why they can be so emotionally painful may lie in parental 
behaviour towards the person in childhood. Parental behaviour involving 
mostly the absence of positive outcomes (withdrawal, lack of praise, not 
paying attention when necessary) could lead to a high actual: ideal discrep-
ancy whereas the behaviour of parents which may mostly involve the pres-
ence of negative outcomes, (punishment, criticism, rejection) may lead to a 
high actual: ought discrepancy. Such behaviour, ifpersistent throughout early 
and late childhood, may result in chronic discrepancies, precipitating in 
emotional, problems and psychological maladjustment. 
The following studies review the possible factors which may account 
for the presence (or absence) of discrepancies in individuals: 
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Freud (1899 /1950) was of the opinion that undesirable life events in 
the childhood of an individual are responsible for many psychological disor-
ders. He termed recalled childhood experiences as 'screen memories' and 
believed that the manifest content of the memory should be analysed in order 
to uncover its latent meaning lying under the surface of the unconscious. 
Freud explained that many undesirable events are repressed because of their 
inherently sexual nature, and thus are unacceptable to the individual. Such 
memories emerge from memory in a distorted form and only by uncovering 
its latent meaning can it be understood what the memory actually points 
towards. ' 
Certain emotions may develop and manifest themselves in the behaviour 
of children during an intense emotional experience through learning and 
conditioning in the environmental situation. These, if persistent, may con-
tinue through to adulthood as well, Watson and Reyner( 1920)demonstrated 
that fear could be 'taught' to a child. The child was presented with the rat, and 
at the same time, a loud, frightining bell went off. Gradually after some trials 
the child screamed whenever the rat was brought near him, even though the 
bell was not now sounded. Once fear was learned, the child generalized his 
fear of white rats to other similar objects as well. This behaviour, when tested 
a month later, was still found to be present in the child. Thus, emotions may 
be 'learnt' responses which the individual has been taught to feel in particular 
situations, and generalized to other similar situations as well. 
Dudycha and Dudycha (1933) in an extensive study of early memories, 
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found that most memories had accompanying emotions, prominent amongst 
which were fear (30.4%),joy (27.9%) and anger (10.3%) amongst others. 
These results suggest that experiencing certain emotions from childhood 
many lead to a definite pattern of experiencing events and emotional re-
sponses, thus learnt, may manifest themselves in adult behaviour, which in 
turn may lead to a presence or absence of discrepancy. 
Sullivan (1953) was intensely concerned with the anxiety arousing 
aspects of interpersonal relationship during early development. He believed 
that a lack of love and care of the infant can lead to an insecure and anxious 
human being. This is because the infant is completely dependent upon 
' significant others' for meeting all his physical and psychological needs. He 
also believed that early childhood relationships played an important role in 
shaping the self concept which he saw as constructed largely out of the 
reflected appraisals of significant others. For example, if a child perceives 
others as rejecting him or treating him as being of no worth, he will most 
likely view himself in a similar light and will develop a negative self image 
that almost invariably leads to maladjustment. Thus,Sullivans interpersonal 
model places strong emphasis on unsatisfactory interpersonal relationships 
which extend back to childhood, thus distorting a person's self concept. 
Pressey and Kuhlen (1957) put forward a critical hypothesis, stating 
that there are certain critical periods when the experiences will have a more 
serious outcome and far reaching consequences. They are of the view that 
habit patterns and personality, including patterns of emotional response, 
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become more rigid with increasing age and thus emotional experiences 
would have a stronger impact psychologically, especially when the person is 
young - i.e, the younger the individual at the time of an intensely emotional 
experience the more constructive or destructive the experience may be. It 
may thus be assumed, therefore, that certain experiences which are 'critical', 
or significant for the individual, will have a stronger impact on him, and he 
will recall the emotions he experienced whenever he recalls the events at a 
later stage. 
Coopersmith (1967) studied a sample of normal, middle-class urban 
boys from pre-adolescence to early adulthood. He examined their family 
backgrounds through interviews and found that children with high self esteem 
are those that are more competent and who are exposed to parental models 
high in self esteem. 
Vinokur and Selzer (1975) investigated the relationship between life 
events and specific stress-related phenomena. The results indicated that 
undesirable life events were substantially correlated with various stress -
related variables such as anxiety, tension, distress, aggression, paranoia, 
depression and drinking. They also found that undesirable life events re-
quired greater adjustments them desirable events. These results can be 
interpreted in the light of discrepancy theory that individuals who experience 
adverse (negative) life events may possess specific types of discrepancies 
depending upon which emotion is predominant in the individual's personality 
structure. Similarly Lewinsohn and Graf (1979) found that a number of 
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people who are depressed engage in a smaller number of pleasant activities. 
They assumed that pleasant events are a major subset of all positive rein-
forcements and that, therefore, measurement of pleasant events may be used 
to approximate measurements of positive reinforcements. They also found 
that prior to becoming depressed, individuals engaged in a smaller number of 
pleasant activities. Since it is known that depressed individuals have a low 
concept of themselves, it can be expected that experiencing negatively toned 
events may lead to a low self concept and negative well being. 
Two other psychologists who have done extensive work on the features 
and content of positive life events are Reich and Zautra (1981; Zautra and 
Reich, 1983). Reich and Zautra found that subjects who experimentally 
induced to engage in a large number of positive events later experienced 
reduced psychiatric distress, but only if they also reported having experi-
enced a high number of prior negative events. Also, in a review of the 
literature on positive andnegative events, Zautra and Reich(1983) found that 
positive events tended to relate to positive aspects of well being (rated 
pleasantness of events, increased positive affect), but had few significant 
relationships with such negative states as distress, depression, 
symptomatology, and so on. Negative events related directly to negative well 
being and occasionally inversely with positive wellbeing. 
Consequently, Reich and Zautra (1988) proposed a tentative model focused 
the influence of positive and negative events on wellbeing. Reich and Zautra 
proposed that positive events enhance an individual's sense of control over 
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the events in one's life, which in turn leads to an enhancement of positive 
mood, generates optimism about events in the near future, and raises self-
esteem. On the other hand, negative events are expected to lower one's sense 
of control and thus raise threats about future control, increase distress, 
negative mood, depression and other symptomatology. 
Veit and Ware (1983) using the Mental Health Inventory (MIH) over a 
one year period on a total of 5,089 subjects confirmed the hypothesis that the 
items on the scale which described positive states (experiences) clustered 
together to define psychological well being, and the items describing nega-
tive states clustered together to define psychological distress. 
Vinokur and Caplan (1986) found significant negative correlation 
between frequency control and anticipation of pleasant events, and a 
measure of poor mental health (r's = 20, p < .001). 
Patterson et al., (1992) found that experiencing adverse life events 
during childhood may increase vulnerability to physical illnesses and psy-
chological disorders during adulthood. Patterson and his associates devel-
oped and administrated to 92 relatively healthy elderly individuals an Early 
Life Events Questionnaire with 12 subscales. The results indicate that those 
who grew up in a family with a harsh climate and whose affiliation needs were 
not tended to have more psychological and physical symptoms in old age. 
Chapter-3 
M E T H O D O L O G Y 
As stated in chapter 1, the purpose of the present study was to measure 
the kind of and level of discrepancy of the subjects, and to analyse certain 
important aspects of their recalled past events. For testing the hypotheses 
stated at the end of the first chapter, high and low discrepancy groups (ideal, 
ought) had to be identified, and then each subject had to recall five signifi-
cant events that took place in their past life, one event from each specific 
time r«ige (i) 0 - 5 years of age, (ii) 6-10 years, (iii) 11-15 years, (iv) 
16-20 years, and (v) above 21 years of age to their present age. The tools 
developed for the identification of the discrepancy groups and collection of 
past memories from the subjects are described below in detail : 
Materials : 
(i) Measure of Self Discrepancy. 
The Self Discrepancy Questionnaire developed for the present study 
[see Appendix 11(a)] was a modified form of the Selves Questionnaire 
developed by Higgins, Klein, and Strauman (1985), which was later revised 
by Strauman and Higgins (1987). The original questionnaire by Higgins et al. 
(1985) was designed to measure three self domains (actual, ideal, ought) 
from two standpoints (own, other). Combining the three self domains with 
the two standpoints yielded six kinds of self - state representations : 
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(i) actual - own, (ii) actual - other, (iii) ideal - own, (iv) ideal - other, (v) ought 
- own, and (vi) ought - other. Both the actual - own and the actual - other may 
combine to form what is called the 'self - concept'. The other four self -
states are the self guides of the individual. According to Higgins (1987), a 
person may possess one or more kinds of the self guides, and thus may have 
one or more kinds of discrepancies. Higgins et al. (1986) used only the 
actual-own representation as a measure of the self concept since it repre-
sented the person's own views of himself. In his many studies, Higgins, too, 
took only the actual - own self state as a measure of the self - concept of an 
individual. This was also adhered to in the formulation of the present 
questionnaire. 
Only one modification was made which differentiated the present 
questionnaire from that of Higgins, Klein, and Strauman's Selves Question-
naire. During a pilot study conducted by the present investigator with the 
Selves questionnaire, it was found that subjects were unable to distinguish 
between possible attributes for the ought - own and the ought - other self 
states. One possible reason for this may lie in the prevalent social norms of 
Indian society, where an individual's sense of moral obligation and duty is 
developed from childhood according to what is expected of him by his 
parents and family members, as well as society in general. This assumption 
was confirmed by the subjects themselves who said that their ought self 
attributes were mostly a reflection of their parent's expectations of them, 
rather than their own individual sense of duty. Keeping in view this possibil-
ity, the ought discrepancy was measured using only the ought - other self 
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State. 
Thus, the final questionnaire had two parts: Part -1 measured the own-
self states (i) the actual- own (or the self concept of the individual) and (ii) 
the ideal - own (a person's own hopes, ideals, and aspirations), while part II 
measured the other self states (iii) the ideal - other (the hopes, ideals and 
aspirations that a significant other has for the individual), and (iv) the ought 
- other (a sense of duty, moral obligations, and responsibilities that a 
significant other expects the individual to possess). The subject was required 
to freely recall ten attributes for each self state. By asking the subject to 
freely recall the attributes, instead of selecting them from a constrained 
checklist, the likelihood that the attributes would be more important to the 
subject was increased. After listing the attributes, the subject had to rate 
each attribute on a four - point scale that was given alongside each attribute, 
which ranged from slightly possess (1) to extremely possess (4). This scale 
was used to measure the extent to which the individual possessed each 
attribute, and was also a part of the Selves Questionnaire that was revised by 
Strauman and Higgins (1987). 
(ii). Recall of Life Events. 
The Life Events Interview was a semi - structured, tape recorded 
interview, whose purpose was to collect detailed information about signifi-
cant, past life events. Five personally important or significant events were 
collected from each individual, one from each time - range : 0-5 years of age, 
6-10 years, 11-15 years, 16-20 years, and above 21 years of age to the 
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individuals present age. This way, significant events covering the whole life 
span of the individual were collected. The subject was asked to keep in mind 
the following details while recalling the past memory : (i) the people who 
were present with the subject at the time of the event, (ii) the behaviour of 
the person or persons towards the subject in the recalled event, (iii) the 
emotions / feelings experienced at the time of occurrence of the event, (iv) 
the overall tone of the memory. During the course of the interview, the 
subject was allowed to freely recollect the memory in detail without inter-
ruption, except when he/she failed to mention a relevant detail crucial to the 
study. The mean duration of the completed interview was 36.50 minutes. 
(iii). Analysis of Recalled Life Events. 
The Life Events Rating scale was developed to analyse different 
dimensions of the recalled events. The scale is divided into two 
sections; 
1. The first section consisted of rating scales used to measure four different 
aspects of the recalled event [see Appendix 11(b)]. These four aspects, as 
described below, were rated by the subject himself after he/she had com-
pleted the recall of a life event in a particular time range : 
(a). Emotional Content. 
The emotions which were recalled by the subject in the past life event 
were to be noted down and rated by the subject on a seven - point scale that 
ranged from very less (1) to very much (7), to indicate the intensity of the 
emotion as experienced in the recalled event by the subject. 
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(b). Nature of Event: 
This indicates the overall tone of the event as perceived by the subject. 
The events were rated by the subject as either positive or negative, depending 
mainly upon the nature of outcome of the event, 
(c). Degree of Pleasantness / Unpleasantness : 
This indicates the degree to which the recalled memory was pleasant 
or unpleasant for the subject. A four - point rating scale was used for the 
purpose - very pleasant (1), pleasant (2), unpleasant (3), and very unpleasant 
(4). 
(d). Impact of the Event: 
This indicates the extent to which the recalled memory has had an 
impact on the individual. This scale helps in determining the significance of 
the event to the individual. A four - point scale ranging from no impact (1) 
to great impact (4) was used for the purpose. 
2. The second section of the Life Event Rating Scale [see Appendix 11(c)] 
was developed to measure the behaviour of the significant other towards 
the subject as expressed in the memory '. The behaviour of the significant 
other was loded under two major categories - (i) behaviour leading to an 
absence or presence of positive reinforcement, and (ii) behaviour leadingto 
an absence or presence of negative reinforcement. 
1. Since the main objective of the study was to analyse the behaviour of significant others as 
realled in the memories, those subjects who recalled one or more events in which the death of a 
significant other had occured were not included for this part of the analysis. 
\ ^ i ' 5 ' - - - ' - i % 
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In order to classify the recalled behaviour of significant others which 
was indicative of an absence / presence of positive reinforcements, 26 
content categories were formulated for the purpose. Similarly, 24 content 
categories were formulated to indicate a presence / absence of negative 
reinforcement (see Appendix C, part II). Unlike the rating scales in section 
1, the behaviour of significant others as expressed by the subject in the 
memory was analysed and coded by the investigator. To obtain an individual 
score, the number of absence of positive reinforcements, and the number of 
presence of negative reinforcements in each event were added up separately 
for each subject. These type of behaviour indicated a negative attitude of the 
significant other towards the individual. Similarly, the number of presence 
of positive reinforcements and the number of an absence of negative rein-
forcements in each event were added up separately, for each individual. 
These behaviours indicated a positive attitude of the significant otliers 
towards the individual in the recalled memory. 
Subjects : 
Data was collected from a total of 126 subjects, randomly selected 
from various study departments at Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. All 
the subjects selected were above the age of 21 years (mean age- 23.3 years) 
and had completed, or were in the final year of their post - graduation. 
Subjects were categorized into high and low discrepancy groups on the basis 
of their discrepancy scores. Those subjects who showed no discrepancy (a 
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score of zero) or who showed either a positive or negative discrepancy upto 
a value of 2.9 were excluded. This led to the dropping of 44 subjects from the 
study. Thus the final sample consisted of a total of 82 subjects. The 
breakup of subjects according to the type(s) of discrepancies they 
possessed was as under : 
High Ideal Discrepancy = 35 
Low Ideal Discrepancy = 34 
High Ought Discrepancy = 32 
Low Ought Discrepancy = 42 
Procedure : 
The data for the present study was collected on an individual basis. 
Subjects were approached one by one by the investigator and were told that 
the study was being conducted to study the types of past life events of the 
individual, and that it required them to fill up a questionnaire about certain 
personal traits, which would be followed by an interview in which the subject 
would be required to recall five personally significant life events, one from 
each specified time range - 0-5 years of age, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, 16-20 
years, and above 21 years of age to his/her present age. Upon receiving 
consent, the subject was taken to a room and was first given the Self 
Discrepancy Questionnaire. Although the questionnaire had printed instruc-
tions, subjects were also verbally briefed about its contents. The subject had 
to list upto ten attributes for each of the self states actual - own, ideal -
own, ideal - other, and ought - other. The subject was also required to rate 
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each attribute an a four -point scale that ranged from slightly possess (1) to 
extremely possess (4). If the subject experienced difficulty in recalling an 
attribute for a particular self state, he/she was cued with possible words by 
the investigator. The minimum number of attributes that the subject was 
required to write down was seven, failing which they were dropped from the 
study. 
After completing the Self Discrepancy Questionnaire, the subject was 
interviewed about certain events which were significant for the him/her in 
some way or the other. The subject was seated in a room alone with the 
investigator so as to ensure privacy. Before commencement of the interview, 
the subject was reassured by the investigator that whatever he recalled would 
be kept strictly confidential and that his/her name would not be revealed in 
the report of data. 
The interview was conducted using a tape-recorder for the purpose. 
Sixteen interviews were handwritten by the investigator when the subject 
would not, on any account, agree to have his personal events recorded 
on tape. The interview commenced with the following instructions to 
the subjects. 
"You are required to recall an event from the time range of.. .(specified). 
The event should have been most significant to you in some way. Try to recall 
the event in as much detail as you possibly can, keeping in mind the kind of 
emotions you experienced and felt at the time, those who were present with 
you in the events, the behaviour of the other person(s) towards you, and the 
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degree to which you liked or disliked the event". 
The subject was allowed to narrate the event without interruption, so 
as to ensure free flow of thought. However, if the subject failed to mention 
certain details important to the investigator, he was asked the following 
question/questions : 
(a) How old were you when this event took place ? 
(b) Who was present with you in the event ? 
(c) What was the reaction/behaviour of the other, person towards you ? 
(d) Describe the emotions/feelings you experienced at the time of the event. 
After the recall of each life event, the subject was given section I of 
the Life Event Rating Scale and was asked to rate each of the following on the 
rating scale provided for the purpose: 
(1) the kind of emotions that the subject had felt at the time of the past event, 
and the intensity with which he/she experienced each emotions; 
(2) the nature of the event (positive or negative); 
(3) the degree to which the event was pleasant or unpleasant for him/her; 
(4) the impact of the event on the individual at the time of its occurrance. 
Upon completing the rating scale, the subject was thanked and was 
allowed to leave the room. 
Formation of High And Low Discrepancy Groups : 
The discrepancy of each subject was determined by counting the 
number of attributes in the actual - own self state that matched with the 
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attributes of a self-guide (ideal-own, ideal-other, ought-other). 'Matches' 
were defined by Higgins, Klein and Strauman (1985) as those attributes in 
the actual-own state that are synonymous with the attributes of a self-guide, 
and when the ratings of both attributes do not differ by more than one point. 
'Mismatches' were indicated by (i) the number of antonyms between the 
actual-own state and a self guide (ie, one attribute in the actual-own state is 
the antonym of an attribute in the self-guide), and (ii) by the number of 
synonymous mismatches (where the rating of an attribute in the actual-own 
state differ from the rating of a synonymous attribute in the self guide by 
more than one point). Both synonymous and antonymous attributes were 
identified with the help of Rogets Thesaurus. The total number of synony-
mous matches, antonymous mismatches, and synonymous mismatches were 
added up separately for each individual. For the ideal discrepancy, the mean 
number of matches and mismatches were calculated by combining the ideal-
own and the ideal-other states. 
After identifying the antonymous mismatches, synonymous matches 
and synonymous mismatches for each self state, the discrepancy of each self 
state was calculated by applying Strauman's and Higgins (1987) formula: 
Discrepancy = SMM + (2 x AMM) - SM 
where: 
SMM = Synonymous mismatches; 
AMM = Antonymous mismatches; 
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SM = Synonymous matches. 
A positive (+) score indicated a higher number of mismatches, and 
thus, a high discrepancy, while a negative (-) score indicated less number of 
mismatches than matches, and thus a low discrepancy. To make the distinc-
tion between high and low discrepancy subjects in each self state more sharp, 
only those subjects whose discrepancy scores were +3 and above, or -3 and 
below were included in the final analysis. 
Coding of the recalled events : 
Emotions. The emotions recalled by the subject in the memories were coded 
into four distinct categories with the help of Rogets thesaurus: dejection, 
elation, agitation and tranquility. The average number of dejection and 
elation - related emotions were individually identified for high and low ideal 
discrepancy subjects, while the mean number of agitation and tranquility -
related emotions were individually identified for high and low ought dis-
crepancy subjects. 
Nature of Outcome. The number of positive and negative events recalled by 
subjects in each discrepancy group were individually identified. Bruhn's 
(1985) definition and guidelines for interpretation of positive and negative 
early memories were used as a basis for identifying the event as having either 
a positive or negative outcome. 
Degree of Pleasantness / Unpleasantness. This was decided by the subject 
himself, who rated each recalled event on a four-point scale- very pleasant 
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(1), pleasant (2), unpleasant (3), and very unpleasant (4). The number of very 
pleasant, pleasant, unpleasant and very unpleasant events were grouped together 
separately for both high and low ideal discrepancy groups, and high and low ought 
discrepancy groups. 
Impact of Event. Subjects' ratings of events as having no impact (1) little 
impact (2), much impact (3), and great impact (4), were grouped together by 
adding up the number of events in each category, separately for high and low 
ideal discrepancy groups and high and low ought discrepancy groups. 
Behaviour of Significant Others. The behaviour of significant others was 
analysed by the investigator and coded into the content categories specially 
formulated for the purpose. The number of behaviour categories which 
represented an absence presence of positive reinforcements, and those 
behaviour categories which represented a presence/absence of negative 
reinforcements, were added up separately for each individual, the former for 
high and low ideal discrepancy subjects and the latter for high and low ought 
discrepancy subjects. 
Statistical Analysis : 
In order to analyse the data collected for the present study, the 
following statistical techniques were used: 
1. Chi square : Thiswasusedtodetermine whether different levels of ideal 
and ought discrepancy subjects differed with respect to (a) the number of 
emotions recalled, and (b) the outcome of the recalled event. The 2x2 
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contingency table was used for the purpose. 
2. Kolmogorov - Smirnov test (K.S.) : This statistical analysis was used to 
determine the difference between the ratings of different levels of ideal and 
ought discrepancy subjects with respect to (a) intensity of emotions, (b) 
overall affect of event, and (c) impact of positive and negative events. The 
K.S. test is sensitive to any kind of difference inherent in data that is cast into 
maximum possible intervals (Siegal and Castellan, 1988). 
3. Two way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA): This was applied to determine 
whether the type of behaviour exhibited by the significant others towards the 
subject in the recalled events varied (a) according to the type and level of 
discrepancy, and (b) across different age ranges. To do analysis of variance 
involving the percentages of the number of presence/absence of positive, as 
well as negative reinforcements (given by the significant other to the subject 
in the recalled event), arcsin transformation was used to make the data 
appropriate for analysis. This transformation is recommended when the 
original data is in the form of proportions or percentages (Broota, 1989). 
Chapter-4 
R E S U L T S 
The purpose of the present study, as stated in Chapter 1, was to analyse 
the content of the memories recalled by high and low ideal, and high and low 
ought discrepancy subjects with respect to five variables - kind of and 
intensity of emotions nature of the outcome of the event; overall affect of 
the event; impact of the event; and behaviour of the significant others 
towards the subject as expressed in the recalled event. Since each subject 
recalled one event from each of five specified time ranges (0-5 years, 6-10 
years; 11-15 years; 16-20 years; and above 21 years), all the content vari-
ables have been analysed for events that occurred at different specified time 
ranges. Three kinds of statistical analyses - Chi square; Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test, and Analysis of Variance have been used to analyse the data. The 
outcome of statistical analyses are given in the following tables which are 
arranged in the same sequence as the hypotheses. 
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FreauencY of Emotions; 
Table 1.1 Frequency ofpresence and absence ofdejection-related emotions in 
the related events by high and low ideal discrepancy subjects. 
Age range from which 
events were recalled 
0 • 
6 -
11 
16 
21 
5 
10 
- 15 
- 20 
Above 
Level of 
Discrepancy 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low-
High 
Low 
No. of events 
(Emotions 
Recalled) 
1 
1 
3 
0 
13 
10 
17 
7 
20 
9 
15 
12 
No. of events 
(Emotions not 
Recalled) 
21 
2 3 
21 
24 
18 
27 
15 
25 
20 
21 
r 
0.181 
0.262 
4.7g* 
5.459* 
0.159 
•p < .05 
Table 1.1 shows the differences between high and low ideal discrepancy 
subjects with respect to the frequency of recall of dejection related emo-
tions. A significant difference between the two discrepancy groups was 
found with respect to dejection related emotions in the events that occured 
at the time ranges of 11-15 years (JT^  = 4.78) and 16-20 years {X- = 5.459). 
The events that occurred at the others three time ranges did not reveal any 
significant difference between high and low ideal discrepancy subjects with 
regard to presence and absence of dejection - related emotions. The overall 
frequency (not given in table) of dejection related emotions was higher for 
the high ideal discrepancy group than for the low discrepancy group (X^ = 
9.28; p < .01) which means that, in the overall analysis, high ideal discrep-
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ancy subjects recalled more number of dejection - related emotions than did 
low ideal discrepancy subjects. 
Table 1.2 Frequency of presence and absence of elation related emotions in the 
recalled events by high and low ideal discrepancy subjects. 
Age range from M bich 
events were recalled 
0 - 5 
6 - 10 
11 - 15 
16 - 20 
21 Above 
Level of 
Discrepancy 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
No. of events 
(Emotions 
Recalled) 
10 
19 
13 
15 
1 1 
20 
1 1 
20 
1 0 
1 8 
No. of events 
(Emotions not 
Recalled) 
24 
14 
21 
19 
24 
14 
24 
14 
25 
15 
X' 
4.32» 
0.60 
4.18* 
4.18» 
3.719 
•p < .05 
Table 1.2 shows that the difference between high and low ideal discrepancy 
subjects with respect to the frequency of elation - related emotions is 
significant for events recalled at three specified time ranges - 0-5 years {X^ 
= 4.32); ll-15years;(X2 = 4.18)andl6-20years(A'2 = 4.18). The frequency 
of elation - related emotions recalled in the past events was higher for low 
ideal discrepancy subjects (X^ = 17.41; p< .001) which indicates that on an 
average, low ideal discrepancy subjects recalled more number of elation -
related emotions than high ideal discrepancy subjects. 
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Table 1.3 Frequency of presence and absence of agitation related emotions in the 
recalled events by high and low ought discrepancy subjects. 
Age range from ^ bich 
events were recalled 
0 - 5 
6 - 10 
n - 15 
16 - 20 
21 Above 
Level of 
Discrepancy 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low-
High 
Low 
No. of events 
(Emotions 
Recalled) 
17 
13 
16 
16 
14 
12 
14 
14 
19 
9 
No of events 
(Emotions not 
Recalled) 
14 
26 
15 
26 
18 
30 
18 
28 
13 
32 
X^ 
2.44 
0.831 
0.75 
0.45 
9 .12** 
**p < .01 
Table 1.3 shows the frequency of the presence and absence of agitation -
related emotions recalled by ought discrepancy subjects. It may be seen that 
only one time range 21 above revealed a significant difference between high 
and low ought discrepancy groups {X^ = 9.12; p < .01).No other significant 
difference was found between the discrepancy groups with respect to agita-
tion related emotions in the other four specified time ranges from which 
events were recalled. However, the overall frequency of agitation related 
emotions was higher for high ought discrepancy subjects than for low ought 
discrepancy subjects {X^= 13.5; p <.001) which means that the high ought 
discrepancy group recalled more number of agitation related emotions in 
their recalled past events as compared to low ought discrepancy subjects. 
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Table 1.4 Frequency of presence and absence of tranquility related emotions in the 
recalled events by high and low ought discrepancy subjects. 
Age range from which 
events were recalled 
0 - 5 
6 - 10 
11 - 15 
16 - 20 
21 Above 
Level of 
Discrepancy 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low-
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
No. of events 
(Emotions 
Recalled) 
5 
6 
3 
10 
4 
11 
5 
8 
6 
9 
No. of events 
(Emotions 
Recalled) 
26 
33 
28 
32 
28 
31 
27 
34 
26 
32 
X^ 
0.06 
1.56 
1.34 
0.005 
0.001 
Table 1.4 above indicates the difference between high and low ought 
discrepancy subjects with respect to the frequencies of presence and ab-
sence of tranquility related emotions recalled in the events. None of the five 
age ranges from which the subjects recalled their events revealed a signifi-
cant difference between high and low ought discrepancy subjects. The 
overall analysis of frequencies taken from all five age range specifications 
also revealed that the differences were not significant (A^  = 2.64). 
Intensity of Emotions ; 
The intensity of emotions recalled by high and low groups for both 
type of discrepancies were rated by the subjects on a 7-point scale that 
ranged from very less (1) to very high (7). The Kolmogorov - Smirnov test 
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was applied to detect whether a difference exist between high and low 
discrepancy groups at any point on the rating scale. 
Table 2.1 Average intensity ratings of dejection 
recalled by high and low ideal discrepancy subejcts 
Vge range fr 
vhich event 
was recalled 
0 - 5 
6 - 10 
11 - 15 
1 6 - 2 0 
21 above 
nm Level of Dis-
crepancy 1 
Hi oh 
nigli 
Hi oh 
nigii 
Hioh 
nign 
Low 
High 
Low-
High 
Low 
Average Rating of Dejection 
1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 
3 
2 
1 
. 1 . - . . 
- 1 - - . 1 
1 
. . . ] . -
2 
4.5 
1 
1 
-
1 
1 
related emotions in 
Reli 
5 
3 
4 
2 
1 
1 
2 
4 
2 
5 
ited Emotions. 
5.5 
1 
2 
1 
-
-
2 
6 
3 
2 
4 
3 
10 
12 
4 
4 
4 
3 
6.5 
1 
2 
1 
4 
2 
2 
1 
7 
5 
3 
2 
1 
1 
8 
2 
4 
1 
the events 
n 
mnD 
13 
64.09* 
10 
13 
22.1 
10 
17 
54.02 
7 
20 
34.20 
9 
15 
72.00 
12 
*p<.05 
Table 2.1 shows the differences between high and low ideal discrepancy 
groups with respect to the intensity ratings of dejection related emotions 
recalled in the events from different specified age ranges. It can be seen 
from the table that a significant difference exists with respect to only one 
of the five specified age ranges from which the subjects were asked to recall 
events. The mnD value for recalled events from the age range of 0-5 years 
(mnD = 64.02) was significant at .05 level of confidence,/the mnD values 
were not found to be significant in the other four age ranges from which the 
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subjects recalled events. However, the overall A^  for all the recalled events 
taken together was 7.369 (p< .05; KS test for N > 25) suggesting that high 
ideal discrepancy subjects experience of dejection - related emotions with 
higher intensity than do low ideal discrepancy subjects. 
Table 2.2 Average intensity ratings of elation related emotions in the events recalled 
by high and low ideal discrepancy subjects. 
Age range from Average Rating of Elation Related Emotions, 
which event Level of Dis- _ _ ^ ^ ^ _ ^ _ ^ ^ _ ^ - ^ — — — ^ ^ ^ - — ^ ^ ^ _ ^ — — — . 
was recalled crepancv 1 1.5 2 2.S 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 mnD 
High 1 - 3 - 3 - 3 10 
0 - 5 26.98 
Low - . - . - - 1 1 4 4 3 3 3 19 
High 2 - 3 1 6 1 - 13 
6 - 1 0 76.05 
Low 3 1 4 3 4 1 5 
High - 1 1 2 2 5 - - 11 
1 1 - 1 5 77.00 
Low 1 - 3 2 7 2 5 20 
High 1 - 1 1 5 - 3 11 
1 6 - 2 0 37.18 
Low . . . - 1 - 1 . 5 - 9 1 3 20 
High 1 1 2 2 4 10 
21 above 37.98 
Low 1 - - 2 - 8 3 4 18 
Table 2.2 reveals that none of the five age range specifications from which 
the subjects recalled events showed a significant difference between high 
and low group with respect to the intensity ratings of elation - related 
emotions in the recalled events. The difference in overall intensity ratings 
was also not significant. (>Y^  =1.37). 
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Table 2.3 Average intensity ratings of agitation related emotions in the recalled 
events by high and low ought discrepancy subjects. 
\ ge range from Average Rating of Agitation Related Emotions, 
which event Level of Dis 
was recalled crepancy 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 mnD 
0 - 5 
High 
Low 2 5 
0 4 1 8 17 
4 1 0 13 
104.09' 
6 - 10 
High 
Low 
2 1 3 3 6 16 
128.00' 
6 3 5 0 1 16 
11 -15 
High 
Low 
2 1 6 
5 0 1 
4 14 
3 12 
74.08 
1 6 - 2 0 
High 
Low 
3 3 
1 4 
4 14 
3 14 
24.02 
21 above 
High 
Low 
2 3 5 19 
15.013 
0 3 0 2 9 
•••p<.05 
Table 2.3 shows that high and low ought discrepancy subjects differed on the 
intensity ratings of agitation related emotions in the recalled events with 
respect to two age ranges : 0-5 years (mnD = 104.09) and 6-10 years (mnD= 
128.00), both at .05 level of confidence. The other three age ranges from 
which subjects recalled events did not reveal any significant differences with 
respect to the intensity ratings of agitation - related emotions. The overall 
difference between the intensity ratings of agitation related emotions in all 
the recalled events was, however, significant (X^ = 8.00; p< .05; K.S. testN 
> 25) suggesting that taken together high and low ought discrepancy groups 
differ significantly with respect to the intensity of agitation related emo-
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tions, with the high discrepancy group recalling the emotions with more 
intensity than low discrepancy subjects. 
Table 2.4 Average intensity ratings of tranquility - related emotions in the recalled 
events by high and low ought discrepancy subjects. 
Age range fron 
fihich event 
was recalled 
0- 5 
6 - 10 
11 - 15 
16-20 
21 above 
1 
Level of D i s^ 
crepancy 1 
Hi oh 
n i g n 
High 
Hioh 
n i g a 
High 
Low 
HioVi 
Average Rating of Tranquility Related Emotions. 
1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
"I 
1 
3 
_ _ -> 
. . . . 1 . . 1 
. . . 1 . . . . 
1 . 1 
"i 
5.5 
1 
-
-
1 
6 
2 
2 
1 
3 
7 
1 
3 
2 
6.5 
-
: 
1 
2 
2 
7 
2 
2 
1 
6 
2 
2 
2 
1 
3 
n 
5 
6 
3 
10 
4 
11 
5 
8 
6 
9 
mnD 
13.02 
9.00 
8.00 
11.00 
21.00 
Table 2.4 shows that high and low ought discrepancy subjects do not differ 
with respect to intensity ratings of tranquility related emotions in any of the 
five age ranges from which the subjects recalled the events. The overall 
difference between the intensity ratings of tranquility emotions for all the 
recalled events was also not significant (X^ = 0.974) for high and low ought 
discrepancy groups. 
Thus, with respect to the frequency and intensity of emotions in the 
recalled past events, it was found that: 
(1) High ideal discrepancy subjects recalled more dejection related emo-
tions for all recalled events taken together than low ideal discrepancy 
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subjects, and assigned higher intensity ratings to the emotions than low 
discrepancy subjects. 
(2) Low ideal discrepancy subjects recalled more number of elation related 
emotions in the recalled events as compared to high discrepancy sub-
jects. No difference was found for intensity ratings of elation related 
emotions for the two groups. 
(3) In the overall analysis high ought discrepancy subjects recalled more 
number of agitation related emotions, and rated their intensity higher as 
compared to low ought discrepancy subjects. 
(4) There was no observed overall difference between high and low ought 
discrepancy subjects with respect to both frequency and intensity of 
tranquility related emotions in the recalled events. 
Outcome of Events : 
High and low ideal discrepancy subjects were compared with respect 
to the number of positive and negative outcomes of the events occurring at 
each specified age range. Thus, a 2 x 2 contingency table was formed for 
events recalled from each specified age range and A^  was applied to test the 
significance of difference. The results of this analysis are presented below 
in tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
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Table 3.1 Number of positive and negative outcome of recalled events for high 
and low ideal discrepancy subjects. 
Age range from which 
events were recalled 
0 
6-
11 
16 
• 5 
10 
- 15 
-20 
21 Above 
Level of 
Discrepancy 
Higji 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
Number 
Positive 
15 
29 
IS 
22 
11 L 
28 
13 
24 
12 
19 
of Outcomes 
Negative 
19 
4 
19 
12 
24 
6 
22 
10 
23 
14 
X^ 
12.35*** 
2.13 
16.18*** 
6.47* 
2.78 
•p<.05 ; •*• p<.001 . 
Table 3.1 shows the difference between high and low ideal discrepancy 
subjects "with respect to the nature of outcome of the recalled event. A 
significant difference was found for three age ranges from which subjects 
recalled events - 0-5 years ( ^ = 12.35; p< .001), 11-15 years (Jk^  = 16.18; 
p < .001) and 16- 20 years ( ^ = 6.47; p< .05) This indicates that high ideal 
discrepancy subjects recalled more events with outcomes in these three age 
ranges, while low ideal discrepancy subjects recalled more events with 
positive outcomes. The events at the remaining two age ranges (6-10 years 
and above 21 years) showed no significant difference in this regard ( ^ = 2.13 
and 2.78 respectively). However, the overall difference {X^ =39.55; p <.001) 
indicates on an average, high ideal discrepancy subjects recalled more events 
with negative outcomes, while low ideal discrepancy subjects recalled more 
events with positive outcomes. 
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Table 3.2 Number of positive and negative outcomes of recalled events for high 
and low ought discrepancy subjects 
Age range from which 
events were recalled 
0 - 5 
6 - 10 
11 - 15 
16-20 
21 Above 
* p < .05. 
Level of 
Discrepancy 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
Number 
Positive 
15 
29 
16 
21 
12 
28 
13 
21 
10 
24 
of Outcomes 
Negative 
16 
10 
15 
21 
20 
14 
19 
21 
22 
17 
X" 
3.93* 
0.139 
5.10* 
0.32 
4.337* 
Table 3.2 shows the differences in nature of event outcome for high and low 
ought discrepancy subjects. Significant differences were found to be present 
in outcomes of events at three age ranges 0-5 years (A^ == 3.93), 11-15 years 
(X ^ 5.10) and 21 years above {X^ = 4.337), all significant at the .05 level 
of confidence. There was no significant difference between high and low 
discrepancy subjects in the other two age ranges - i.e., 6-10 years {X^ = 
0.139) and 16-20 years ( ^ - 0.32). The overall difference between both 
groups ( ^ = 10.85; p <.01) indicates that on an average, high ought discrep-
ancy subjects recalled more events with negatives outcome, while low ought 
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discrepancy subjects recalled more events with a positive outcome. 
Overall Affect of Memory ; 
The subjects rated the overall affect of the memory on a four point 
scale [very pleasant (1); pleasant (2); unpleasant (3); very unpleasant (4)]. As 
with the intensity ratings of emotions, the Kolmogorov - Smirnov test was 
applied to detect any difference in the ratings of overall affect of the event 
recalled by high and low ideal and ought discrepancy subjects from the five 
specified age ranges. The results are presented below in tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
Table 4.1 Rating of the overall affect of the recalled events for high and low ideal 
discrepancy subjects. 
Age range from 
which events 
were recalled 
0 - 5 
6 - 10 
11 - 15 
16 - 20 
21 above 
Level of 
Discrepancy 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
V.Pl easant 
5 
10 
4 
12 
6 
18 
9 
13 
8 
9 
R i t ings (F 
P l e a s a n t 
4 
1 1 
8 
8 
9 
7 
3 
7 
4 
9 
r e q u e n c i e s ) 
I npl e a s a n t 
1 1 
7 
12 
7 
6 
5 
9 
5 
12 
9 
V.Unpleasant 
14 
5 
10 
7 
14 
4 
14 
9 
11 
6 
X' 
9 . 2 6 " 
3.78 
8 . 8 3 ' 
4.17 
2.78 
•p < .05, **p < .01 
Table 4.1 shows the differences in ratings of the overall affect of memories 
by high and low ideal discrepancy subjects. A significant difference was 
obtained for events occuring at two age ranges: 0-5 years (A^ = 9.26; p<.01) 
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and 11-15 years ( ^ = 8.83; p < .05). The difference between high and low 
discrepancy subjects for events occurring at the other three time ranges 
were not significant (6-10 years = 3.28; 16-20years = 4.17; 21 years above 
= 2.78). The overall difference between the two groups was highly signifi-
cant {X^ =25.39; p <.001) indicating that high ideal discrepancy subjects 
rated the recalled events as more unpleasant, while low ideal discrepancy 
subjects rated more events as more pleasant in nature. 
Table 4.2 Ratings of the overall affect of the recalled memory for high and low ought 
discrepancy subjects 
Age range from 
which events 
were recalled 
0 - 5 
6 - 10 
11 - 15 
16 - 20 
21 above 
Level of 
Discrepancy 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
v.Pleasant 
5 
11 
7 
9 
8 
16 
8 
15 
5 
14 
Ratings (F 
PI easant 
2 
I 3 
6 
9 
8 
1 1 
3 
6 
2 
10 
requencies) 
Unpleasant 
10 
9 
7 
15 
4 
7 
5 
8 
14 
9 
V.Ui ipleasant 
14 
6 
11 
9 
12 
8 
16 
13 
11 
8 
X^  
10.50** 
1.39 
2.46 
2.62 
9 . 6 7 * ' 
** p < .01 
Table 4.2 indicates that high and low ought discrepancy subjects differ with 
respect to the overall affect of recalled events at two age ranges - 0-5 years 
(A^ = 10.50; p < .01) and 21 years above (;^ = 9.67; p < .01), indicating that 
high ideal discrepancy subjects rated the overall affect of the event recalled 
from memory in these age ranges as more unpleasant, while low discrepancy 
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subjects rated the overall affect of memories as more pleasant. No signifi-
cant difference was found in this regard for the events recalled at the other 
three age ranges (6-10 years = 1.39; 11-15 years = 2.46; 16-20 years = 
2.62). The overall difference {X^ =16.004; p <.001) indicates that on an 
average, high ought discrepancy subjects rated the recalled events as being 
more unpleasant in nature, while low ought discrepancy subjects rated the 
events as being more pleasant. 
Impact of Events; 
The impact of the recalled events was rated by the subjects on a four 
- point scale [no impact (1) to great impact (4)]. Since the events had been 
previously identified as having either a positive outcome or a negative one, 
their impact was analysed accordingly, i.e, those events with a positive 
outcome were analysed for positive impact, and events with a negative 
outcome were analysed for negative impact. The Kolmogorov-Smirnovtest 
was applied for the purpose. The results are presented below in tables 5a. 1 
and 5a.2 (ideal discrepancy), and 5b. 1 and 5b.2 (ought discrepancy). 
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Table 5a. 1 Impact ratings of positive events by high and low ideal discrepancy 
subjects 
Age range from 
which events 
•were recalled 
0 - 5 
6 - 10 
11 - 15 
16- 20 
21 above 
Level of 
Discrepancy 
High 
(n-15) 
Low 
(m=29) 
High 
(n=15) 
Low 
(m=22) 
High 
(n=ll) 
Low 
(m=28) 
High 
(n=13) 
Low 
(m=24) 
High 
(n-12) 
Low 
(m=19) 
No Impact 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
1 
1 
0 
Ra 
Litt 
tings (Frequencies) 
e Impact 
8 
15 
9 
8 
2 
1 
3 
4 
3 
4 
Much Impact 
7 
7 
5 
9 
3 
17 
7 
12 
4 
6 
Great Impact 
0 
7 
1 
5 
5 
10 
1 
7 
4 
9 
D 
0.242 
0.237 
0.237 
0.215 
0.134 
Table 5a. 1 shows the frequencies of impact ratings of positive events by high 
and low ideal discrepancy subjects. The results reveal that high and low 
discrepancy subjects did not differ with respect to impact ratings of positive 
events recalled from any of the five age ranges.The overall difference 
between both groups with respect to the impact ratings of positive events was 
also not significant (D= 0.169). 
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Table 5a.2 Impact ratings of negative events by high and low ideal discrepancy 
subjects 
Age range from 
which events 
were recalled 
0 - 5 
6 - 10 
11 - 15 
16 - 20 
21 above 
Level of 
Discrepancy 
High 
(n=I9) 
Low 
(m=4) 
High 
(n=19) 
Low 
(m=12) 
High 
(n=24) 
Low 
(m=6) 
High 
(n=22) 
Low 
(m=10) 
High 
(n=23) 
Low 
(m=14) 
No I mpact 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Ratings (Freq 
Little Impact 
4 
1 
4 
3 
0 
2 
4 
0 
4 
2 
M 
uencies) 
uch Impact 
7 
3 
4 
5 
10 
4 
7 
6 
5 
7 
Great Imp 
8 
0 
10 
4 
14 
0 
10 
4 
14 
5 
act 
D 
0.422 
0.187 
0.584* 
0.227 
0.251 
*p < .05 
Table 5a.2 shows the frequencies of impact ratings assigned to negative 
event by high and low ideal discrepancy subjects. It may be observed that 
there is a significant difference between impact ratings for high and low 
discrepancy subjects in only one of the age ranges from which they recalled 
their past events (11-15 years = 0.584; p < .05). However, the overall 
difference between both groups with respect to the impact ratings was 
significant (D = 0.241, p < .05) in the predicted direction, indicating that 
high ideal discrepancy subjects rated the recalled negative events as having 
more impact as compared to low ideal discrepancy subjects. 
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Table 5b.1 Impact ratings of positive events by high and low ought discrepancy 
subjects. 
Age range from 
which events 
were recalled 
0 - 5 
6 - 10 
11 - 15 
16 - 20 
21 above 
Level of 
Discrepancy 
High 
(n=15) 
Low 
(m=29) 
High 
(n=16) 
Low 
(m=21) 
High 
(n=12) 
Low 
(m=28) 
High 
(n=13) 
Low 
(111=21) 
High 
(n=10) 
Low 
(m=24) 
No Impact 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
2 
0 
1 
Ratings 
Little Imp 
6 
14 
9 
5 
2 
2 
5 
2 
2 
6 
(F 
act 
req uencies) 
Much Impact 
8 
8 
6 
11 
7 
14 
5 
10 
3 
5 
Great Impact 
1 
7 
1 
5 
2 
1 1 
2 
7 
5 
12 
D 
0.175 
0.324 
0.226 
0.271 
0.091 
Table 5b. 1 shows the frequencies of the impact ratings of positive events by 
high and low ought discrepancy subjects. No difference was observed be-
tween high and low discrepancy subjects with respect to any of the five age 
ranges from which they recalled their past memories. The overall difference 
between the impact ratings of the two groups was also not significant (D = 
0.175). 
104 
Table 5b.2 Impact ratings of negative events by high and low ought discrepancy 
subjects 
Age range from 
which events 
were recalled 
0 - 5 
6 - 10 
11 - 15 
16 - 20 
21 above 
Level of 
Discrepancy 
High 
(n=I6) 
Low 
(m=10) 
High 
(n=15) 
Low 
(m=21) 
High 
(n=20) 
Low 
(m=]4) 
High 
(n=19) 
Low 
(111=21) 
High 
(n=22) 
Low 
(ni=17) 
No Impact 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Ra 
LittI 
ting 
e Im 
2 
4 
0 
8 
0 
3 
1 
4 
3 
3 
s (Freq 
|)act M 
uencies) 
uch Impa< 
6 
4 
4 
8 
7 
10 
6 
7 
3 
10 
D 
:t Great Impact 
8 
2 
1 1 
4 
13 
1 
12 
9 
16 
4 
0.30 
0 .543*» 
0 . 5 7 g * ' 
0.288 
0.492*» 
•*p < .01 
Table 5b.2 shows the frequencies of impact ratings of negative events of high 
and low ought discrepancy subjects. A significant difference was found to be 
present for high and low discrepancy groups with respect to three age ranges 
from which subjectsrecalledtheir past events : 6-10 years (0.543; p <.01), 
11-15 years (0.578; p < .01) and 21 above (0.492; p < .01). The D values for 
the other two time ranges were not significant in this regard. The overall 
difference between impact ratings of both groups was also significant (D = 
0.492; p < .001) in the predicted direction, indicating that high ought 
discrepancy subjects rated the negative events as having more impact than 
did low ought discrepancy subjects. 
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Behaviour of Sienificant Others Towards the Subjects in the Recalled 
Events : 
A 2 X 5 (Discrepancy x Age) analysis of variance was performed on the 
content categories, which were used to classify the significant other's 
behaviour towards the subjects in the memory into four distinct kinds : 
1. Presence of positive reinforcement . 
2. Absence of positive reinforcement. 
3. Presence of negative reinforcement . 
4. Absence of negative reinforcement. 
In accordance with the hypotheses, the recalled events of high and low 
ideal discrepancy subjects were analysed for a presence or absence of 
positive reinforcements (provided to the subjects by the significant other in 
the memories) while the recalled events of high and low ought discrepancy 
subjects were analysed for a presence or absence of negative reinforce-
ments. The significant main effects were further analysed to determine 
whether they revealed significant differences between high and low dis-
crepancy subjects at each age range from which subjects recalled their past 
events. The protected t-test was applied for this purpose. The results are 
presented in table 6a. 1 to 6b.2 for ideal discrepancy, and 7a. 1 to 7b.2 for 
ought discrepancy. 
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(i). Ideal Discrepancy ; 
Table 6a.l Summary of 2 x 5 analysis of variance for presence of positive 
reinforcement by discrepancy and age specifications. 
Source of Variation 
Between Ss SS 
A SS (Discrepancy) 
Subjects within SS 
Within Ss SS 
BSS(Age) 
AB-SS(Discrep.XAge) 
B X Subjects within groups SS 
SS 
97417.64 
56701.54 
40716.07 
121089.296 
4742.29 
808.48 
115538.52 
df 
61 
1 
60 
248 
4 
4 
240 
MS 
56701.54 
678.60 
1185.57 
202.12 
481.4 
F 
83.55** 
2.46** 
0.419 
* • F.„ (1,60) = 7.08; '¥.„ (4,240) = 2.41 
Table 6a. 1 gives the summary of 2 x 5 analysis of variance for presence of 
positive reinforcement by discrepancy and age specifications, for high and 
low ideal discrepancy subjects. The F values for both discrepancy and age 
were found to be significant (F (discrep) = 83.55; p < .01; F (age) = 2.46; p 
< .05). The interaction effect (A x B), however, was not significant (F = 
0.419). 
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Table 6a.2 Comparison between means for high and low ideal discrepancy subjects, 
with presence of positive reinforcement as the dependant measure. 
Level of Discrepancy 
HIGH 
LOW 
t 
0 - 5 
41.99 
70.43 
5.10*» 
6-10 
44.64 
68.09 
4.21** 
11 -15 
35.43 
66.86 
5.64** 
16-20 
33.06 
61.68 
5.13** 
21 Above 
46.11 
69.42 
4.18** 
**t (.01) = 2.326 
Table 6a.2 gives the t-values for the difference in the presence of positive 
reinforcement in the memories recalled by high and low ideal discrepancy 
subjects with respect to the five specified age ranges from which subjects 
recalled events. All the t-values were found to be significant at the .01 level 
of confidence with higher means for low ideal discrepancy subjects in all age 
ranges, which indicates that low ideal discrepancy subjects recalled more 
events with presence of positive reinforcement. 
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Table 6a.3 Protected t- test among means for high ideal discrepancy subjects with 
respect to the presence of positive reinforcements in the events recalled 
from different age ranges. 
Age Ranges 16-20 11-15 0 - 5 6 -10 21 Above 
Means 33.06 35 43 41.99 44.64 46.11 
0-5 33.06 - 2.37 8.93 11.58* 13.05**1 
6-10 35.43 - 6.56 9.21* 10.68' 
11-15 41.99 - 2.65 4.12 
16-20 44.64 - 1.47 
2 X MS Error 2x481.41 
n 31 
5.57 
•t.95 (N-K) = t.95(305) = 1.645: LSD = 1.645 X 5.57 = 9.162 
•*t.99(N-K) = t.99 (305) = 2.326; LSD = 2.326 X 5.57 = 12.95 
Table 6a. 3 gives the difference between treatment means for high ideal discrepancy 
subjects across the five age - range levels from which events were recalled by the 
subjects. A significant difference was observed for age ranges 16-20 years and 6-
10 years (11.58, p < .05); 16-20 years and 21 years above (13.05, p < .01); 
11-15 years and 6-10 years (9.21, p< .05); and 11-15 years and 21 above 
(10.68, p < .05). The differences between the other specific time ranges 
were not significant. The above results show that the means of of 6-10 years 
and 21 years are significantly higher than the means of time ranges 11-15 
years and 16-20 years, indicating that subjects recalled significantly more in 
of once of positive reinforcements given to them by significant others in the 
age ranges of 6-10 years and above 21 years than they recalled in the age 
range 11-15 years and 16-20 years. 
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Table 6.a.4 Protected t- test among means for low ideal discrepancy subjects across 
the five age ranges with respect to the presence of positive reinforcement 
Age Ranges 
0-5 
6-10 
11-15 
16-20 
2 X MS Error 
n 
•t.95 (N 
••t .99(N-
-K) 
K) 
Means 
61.68 
66.86 
68.09 
69.42 
2x 
_ 
= t.95 (305) 
= t.99 (305) 
16 - 20 11 - 15 
61.68 66.86 
5.18 
-
481.41 
- 5 57 
31 
0 - 5 
68.09 
6.41 
1.83 
-
= 1.645; LSD = 1.645X5.57 = 
= 2.326; LSD = 2.326X5.57 = 
6 - 10 
69.42 
7.74 
2.56 
1.33 
-
9.162 
12.95 
21 A b o x 
70.43 
8.75 
3.57 
2.34 
1.01 
Table 6a.4 gives the differences between treatment means for low ideal 
discrepancy subjects across the five specified time ranges from which 
events were recalled by the subjects. None of the treatment means were 
significant from one another, indicating that subjects recalled almost similar 
number of positive reinforcements given to them by significant others in the 
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Table 6b.2 gives the t-values for the difference in absence of positive 
reinforcements in the memories recalled by high and low ideal discrepancy 
subjects, with respect to the five specified age-ranges from which subjects 
recalled their past memories. All the t-values are found to be significant with 
higher means for high ideal discrepancy subjects, which indicates as pre-
dicted, that high ideal discrepancy subjects recalled more events which 
absence of positive reinforcements by the significant other, as compared to 
low ideal discrepancy subjects. 
Table 6b.3 Protected t- test among means for high ideal discrepancy subjects with 
absence of positive reinforcement as dependant measure 
AgeR 
0-5 
6-10 
11-15 
16-20 
anges 
Means 
42.62 
45.72 
48.00 
56.27 
2 X MS Error 
n 
•t.95 (N 
**t.99(N 
-K) = 
-K) 
21 Above 
42.62 
-
• 
2x 
t.95 (305) 
t.99(305) 
6- 10 
45.72 
3.1 
-
494.8 
31 
= 1.645; 
= 2.326: 
0 - 5 
48.00 
5.38 
2.28 
-
5,65 
11 -15 
56.27 
13.65** 
10.55* 
8.27 
-
LSD= 1.645X5.65 = 
LSD = 2.326X2.326 = 
16-20 
56.93 
14.31** 
11,21* 
8.93 
0.66 
9.19 
13.14 
Table 6b.3 shows the treatments means of high ideal discrepancy subjects 
for absence of positive reinforcement with respect to the five age ranges 
from which subjects recalled events. A significant difference was found for 
age - ranges 11-15 and 21 above (13.65; p < .01). 11-15 and 6-10 years 
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(10.55; p< .05); 16-20 and 21 above (14.31, p< .01) and 16-20 and 6-10 
years(11.21;p< .05). This indicates that the means of the age ranges 11-15 
years and 16-20 years are significantly higher than the means of the age 
ranges 21 above and 6-10 years - i.e, subjects recalled higher number of 
absence of positive reinforcement as compared to the memories recalled in 
the age ranges of 21 above and 6-10 years. 
Table 6b.4 Protected t- test among treatments means for low ideal discrepancy 
subjects with absence of positive reinforcement as the dependant measure. 
Age Ranges 
0-5 
6-10 
11-15 
lf-20 
Means 
19.56 
20.39 
22.38 
24.99 
2 X MS Error 
•t.95 
n 
(N -K) = 
0 - 5 21 Above 
19.56 20.39 
0.83 
-
2x494.89 
_ 
31 
t.95 (305) = 1.645; 
6-10 
22.38 
2.82 
1.99 
-
5.65 
11 -15 
24.99 
5.43 
4.60 
2.61 
-
LSD= 1.645 X 5.65 = 9.19 
16-20 
28.31 
8.75 
7.92 
5.93 
3.32 
Table 6b.4 gives the differences between treatment means for low ideal 
discrepancy subjects with respect to absence of positive reinforcements 
given to the subject by the significant other as recalled in the events by the 
subject. No difference between the treatment means was found to be signifi-
cant for low ideal discrepancy subjects. 
In the light of the above results, it may be concluded that (i) the 
behaviour of significant others in the events recalled by low ideal discrep-
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of which age-range specification they are recalled at. The interaction effect 
was also not significant (F = 0.1018). 
Table 7a.2 Comparison between means of high and low ought discrepancy subjects, 
with presence of negative reinforcement as dependant measure 
Level of Discrep 
HIGH 
LOW 
t 
ancy 0 - 5 
41.19 
18.79 
3.54** 
6-10 
52.45 
28.48 
3.79** 
11 -15 
44.88 
27.08 
2.82** 
16-20 
44.74 
25.35 
3.07** 
21 Above 
44.80 . 
26.70 
2.86** 
••t (.01) = 2.326 
Table 7a.2 gives the t-values across the five age-range specifications from 
which events were recalled by high and low ought discrepancy subjects, with 
respect to the presence of negative reinforcements in the recalled events. 
All the values are significant with higher means for high ought discrepancy 
subjects , indicating that high ought discrepancy subjects recalled more 
events with a presence of negative reinforcements given by the significant 
other, as compared to low ought discrepancy subjects. 
Table 7b. 1 Summary of 2 x 5 analysis of variance for absence of negative reinforce 
ment, by high and low ought discrepancy subjects. 
Source of Variation 
Between Ss SS 
A SS (Discrepancy) 
Subjects within SS 
Within Ss SS 
BSS{Age) 
AB-SS (Discrep. X Age) 
B X Subjects within groups SS 
SS 
76638.23 
38411.76 
38226.47 
133097.37 
4302.7 
248.22 
12854645 
df 
59 
1 
58 
240 
4 
4 
232 
MS 
38411.76 
659.07 
1075.67 
68.05 
554.07 
F 
58.28** 
1.94 
0.1119 
F.„ (1,60) = 7.08; *F.„ (4,240) = 2.41 
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Table 7b. 1 gives the summary of analysis of variance for absence of negative 
reinforcement, by discrepancy and age specification, for high and low ought 
discrepancy subjects. The F value for level of discrepancy is significant 
(58.28; p< .01) whereas the F values for age-range specification (1.94 and 
interaction effect (0.1119) are not significant, once again suggesting that 
level of discrepancy alone is the only factor responsible for the differences 
in recalled of absence of negative reinforcements from the past events, 
irrespective of the age-range from which the events were recalled. 
Table 7b.2 Comparison between treatment means for high and low ought discrepancy 
subjects, with absence of negative reinforcement as dependant measure. 
Level of Discrepancy 
HIGH 
LOW 
t 
0 - 5 
48.80 
71.49 
3.73** 
6- 10 
37.55 
61.51 
3.94** 
11 - 15 
40.49 
62.92 
3.69** 
16-20 
45.25 
64.64 
3.19** 
21 Above 
38.62 
63.29 
4.06** 
••t (.01)= 2.326 
Table 7b.2 gives the t-values for the difference in recall of absence of 
negative reinforcements in the memories of high and low ought discrepancy 
subjects, with respect to the five specified age - ranges from which memo-
ries were recalled. All the t-values were found to be significant with higher 
means for low ought discrepancy subjects, which indicates that low ought 
discrepancy subjects recalled more events which contained an absence of 
negative reinforcements as compared to the events recalled by high ought 
discrepancy subjects. 
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negative reinforcements as compared to the events recalled by high ought 
discrepancy subjects. 
The above results indicate that a significant difference exists between 
high and low ought discrepancy subjects with respect to level of discrepancy 
only. High ought discrepancy subjects recalled significant others' behaviour 
in the memories as more indicative of a presence of negative reinforcement 
as compared to low discrepancy subjects, while low ought discrepancy 
subjects recalled the significant other's behaviour in the memories as more 
indicative of an absence of negative reinforcement, compared to high dis-
crepancy subjects. The age range from which events were recalled was not a 
significant predictor of either a presence or absence of negative reinforce-
ment. 
Summary of Results ; 
A comprehensive summary of the findings obtained in the present 
study are as follows : 
1. Number of Emotions . 
A significant difference was found between high and low ideal dis-
crepancy groups with respect to dejection {X^ - 9.28) and elation {X^ = 
17.41), thus confirming the hypotheses that high ideal discrepancy subjects 
recalled more dejection related emotions than low ideal discrepancy sub-
jects, while the low discrepancy group recalled more elation- related emo-
tions as compared to high discrepancy group. For high and low ought 
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discrepancy groups, a significant difference was found for agitation- related 
emotions (X^ = 13.50), but not for emotions related to tranqiflity (A^ = 2.64). 
Thus, while the result confirmed that high ought discrepancy subjects 
recalled more agitation related emotions than did low ought discrepancy 
subjects, the hypothesis regarding tranquility related emotions was re-
jected. 
2. Intensity of Emotions : 
High ideal discrepancy subjects rated the intensity of dejection -
related emotions significantly higher them did low ideal discrepancy sub-
jects. (X^ = 7.369), whereas low ideal discrepancy subjects did not rate 
elation related emotions significantly higher than did high ideal discrepancy 
subjects (A^  = 1.37). For high and low ought discrepancy subjects a signifi-
cant difference was found between the two groups with respect to intensity 
of agitation related emotions (X^ =8.00) but not with respect to tranquility 
related emotions (X^ = 0.934). Thus, the hypothesis with regard to intensity 
of emotions recalled in the event by high and low (ideal / ought) discrepancy 
groups was partially confirmed. 
3. Outcome of Event: 
The findings regarding the nature of outcome of the recalled event 
were in accordance with the hypothesis. High ideal discrepancy subjects 
recalled more events that had a negative outcome as compared to the events 
recalled by low ideal discrepancy subjects, whereas the low ideal discrep-
ancy group recalled more events that had a positive outcome as compared to 
the high ideal discrepancy groups(^ =39.55; p <.001). For ought discrep-
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outcome {X^ =10.85; p <.01). 
4. Overall Affect of the Event : 
High ideal and ought discrepancy subjects rated the overall affect of 
the recalled events as more unpleasnt, while low discrepancy subjects (both 
ideal and ought) rated the overall affect of the events as more pleasant in 
nature [X" (ideal) = 25.39; ^ (ought) = 16.004, p < .001]. 
5. Impact: 
A significant difference with respect to impact ratings of negative 
events was found between both high and low ideal discrepancy subjects (D = 
0.241, p< .05) and high and low ought discrepancy subjects (D = 0.492, p < 
.001), thus indicating that high discrepancy subjects rated the impact of 
negative events higher than low discrepancy subjects. No significant differ-
ence was found between the impact ratings of positive events for high and 
low ideal and ought discrepancy groups. 
6. Behaviour of significant others towards the subject in the recalled event; 
For ideal discrepancy group, significant main effects for both (i) level 
of discrepancy and (ii) age - specification by the subject, were found with 
respect to both presence of positive reinforcement [F (discrep) = 83.55; F 
(age) = 2.46], and absence of positive reinforcement [F (discrep) = 83.46; F 
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(age) = 2.909]. No significant interaction was observed. Significant differ-
ences were also found between means for each age specification for high and 
low ideal discrepancy groups. Thus, the hypothesis that high ideal discrep-
ancy subjects will recalled more frequently an absence of positive rein-
forcements, and low ideal discrepancy subjects will recall more number of 
presence of positive reinforcements given to them by significant others in 
the recalled events, was confirmed. 
For ought discrepancy subjects, with regard to ANOVA'S for both 
presence and absence of negative reinforcements, a significant F score was 
found with respect to the level of discrepancy above (presence of negative 
reinforcement = 58.81; absence of negative reinforcement = 58.28). No 
significant F score was found for age specification and interaction with 
regard to both presence and absence of negative reinforcement. 
Chapter-5 
DISCUSSION 
The present study was an attempt to bring together advances in research 
on the recall of past events and the theoretical formulation of Higgins 
(1987) regarding an individual's perception of what he is and what he ideally 
should be, and what he ought to become, from his own as well as other's 
standpoint. Higgins theoretical formulation regarding the self concept and 
self discrepancy and the reason of the association between nature of 
discrepancy with the individual's susceptibility to dejection and anxiety 
moods gave rise to the expectation that the content of past events recalled by 
a person will be an expression of emotion which he experienced at the time 
of occurrence of the events, as well as the nature of interaction with 
significant others who were present during occurrance of the events as 
participants, dispensors of positive or negative reinforcements supporters, 
sympathizers, or indifferent onlookers. There is no way and even no need, of 
verifying whether the events recalled by a person really occurred in his life 
or not and whether the emotions that he recalls to have experienced were 
really experienced, or whether the behaviour of significant others vis-a-vis 
th<| person was the same as he says it was. The hypotheses formulated and 
tested by the present investigator are not about the 'element of truth' in the 
recalled events and experiences because we subscribe to Bartlett's (1932) 
observation," The past is continually remade,reconstructed in the interest of 
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the present " (p.32). The cognitive - perceptual theory (Bruhn and 
Bellow, 1984; Bruhn, 1990) and other theoretical and empirical contribu-
tions (eg, Adler, 1958; Bartlett, 1932; Bruhn and Last, 1983; Bower and 
Gilligan, 1979; Cantor and Mischel, 1979; Coopersmith, 1976, 1968; 
Festinger, 1957; Higginset al., 1986; Higgins, 1987; Kelly, 1955; Markus, 
1977; Reich and Zautra, 1987; Rogers, 1951; Sullivan, 1940,1953; Zautra 
and Reich, 1983) are the bases of formulation of the hypotheses stated below 
High ideal discrepancy subjects will recall more dejection related 
emotions associated with their past events and will rate them more 
intensely than low ideal discrepancy subjects. 
Low ideal discrepancy subjects will recall more elation related emo-
tions and will them more intensely than high discrepancy subjects. 
High ought discrepancy subjects will recall more agitation related 
emotions associated with their past events and will rate them more 
intensely than low ought discrepancy subjects. 
Low ought discrepancy subjects will recall more emotions associated 
with tranquility in their recalled events and will rate them more 
intensely than high ought discrepancy subjects. 
High discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought) will recall more 
events with a negative outcome than will low discrepancy subjects. 
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6. Low discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought) will recall more 
events with a positive outcome than will high discrepancy subjects. 
7. High discrepancy subjects will rate the overall affect of the recalled 
events as more unpleasant than will low discrepancy subjects. 
8. Low discrepancy subjects will rate the overall affect of the recalled 
events as more pleasant than will high discrepancy subjects. 
9. There will be no difference between the impact ratings of positive 
events recalled by high and low discrepancy subjects (ideal, ought). 
10. There will be no difference between the impact ratings of negative 
events by high and low discrepancy subjects (ideal,ought) 
11. The behaviour of significant others towards high ideal discrepancy 
subjects in the recalled events will be more indicative of an absence 
of positive reinforcements whereas for low ideal discrepancy sub-
jects the behaviour of significant other will be more indicative of a 
presence of positive reinforcements. 
12. The behaviour of significant others towards high ought discrepancy 
subjects in the recalled events will be more indicative of a presence 
of negative rein forcements, while the behaviour of significant others 
towards low ought discrepancy individuals will be more in indicative 
of an absence of reinforcement (and a presence of positive ones). 
The first four hypotheses (numbers 1 to 4) were about the different 
emotions and their intensity that were recalled by high and low (both ideal 
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and ought) discrepancy individuals. The results revealed that in the case of 
ideal discrepancy, subjects with a high discrepancy recalled significantly 
more number of dejection related emotions, and also assigned higher inten-
sity ratings to these emotions. The subjects possessing a low ideal discrep-
ancy recalled significantly more number of elation related emotions. 
However, ther was no difference to be found between the intensity ratings of 
elation related emotions by high and low ideal discrepancy subjects. 
These results indicate a relationship between the nature (ideal) and the 
extent (high, low) of the discrepancy and the kind of emotions recalled in the 
past events. More specifically, these results imply that dejection and elation 
related emotions are available and accessible in the memory of high and low 
ideal discrepancy individuals respectively. These findings support the self-
discrepancy theory of Higgins (1987) and the findings of Higgins et al., 
(1986), that individuals possessing a high ideal discrepancy are more sus-
ceptible to experiencing dejection, and have these emotions more available 
and accessible in memory. The findings regarding the number of elation 
related emotions also supported Higgins assumption about the relationship 
between an absence of ideal discrepancy and emotions related to elation. 
However, the results regarding the intensity ratings of dejection and elation 
related emotions, suggest that as compared to elation related emotions, the 
intense dejection emotions become more apart of the self schemata of high 
ideal discrepancy individuals and are revived with same intensity when 
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recalled in proportion to the intensity that was originally experienced during 
the actual occurrence of the event. This was not the case with the intensity 
ratings of elation related emotions by high and low ideal discrepancy indi-
viduals. 
With regard to the emotions recalled in the past events by ought discrep-
ancy individuals it was found that as compared to low ought discrepancy 
subjects, high ought discrepancy subjects not only recalled greater number 
of agitation related emotion but also assigned higher intensity ratings to 
such emotions. This result again supports Higgins (1987) self discrepancy 
theory as well as the findings of Higgins et al. (1986) that individuals 
possessing a high ought discrepancy have agitation related emotions more 
available and accessible in memory,and that they recall and reconstruct 
mostly those emotions from memory that reflect there present mood which 
is congruent with the type of discrepancy they possess. However, the fourth 
hypothesis regarding the number and intensity of emotions related to tran-
quility recalled by low ought discrepancy subjects was not confirmed by the 
results, as no difference was found between high and low discrepancy groups 
with respect to the number and intensity of these emotions being perceived. 
This finding suggests that tranquility emotions are rarely experienced, and 
are experienced with less intensity in comparison to other extreme affects 
such as dissatisfaction, distress, sadness (dejection), happiness, excite-
ment, joy (elation), or anxiety, fear or guilt (agitation). Further research is 
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to be conducted to find out whether this finding is specific to the age group 
of the subjects employed in the present study (mean age = 23.3 years). 
Erikson's theory of personalty development (1964,1968) implies that dif-
ferent stages in life are characterized by different moods and emotion. 
During the early stages of life, especially during the difficult transition from 
childhood to adulthood, the individual suffers from a confusion of roles; 
what Erikson termed 'identity confusion'. This chaotic state induces feelings 
of isolation, anxiousness, indecisiveness, as well as a fear of being rejected, 
disappointed and misled. During the search for a stable identity, the 
individual behaves in an inconsistent and unpredictable manner,thus precipi-
tating a multitude of conflicting emotions in the individual. As he grows 
older, the person integrates his previous experiences and learns to cope with 
success and failure alike, and thus experiences feelings of wholeness and 
completeness that help in counteracting negative feelings. Thus, it is pos-
sible that the EMs of elderly people may contain more feelings of tranquil-
ity, peace and calmness as compared to other extreme emotions of dejection, 
anxiety and elation, which may be more characteristic of young age than old 
age. This may account for the relatively less number of tranquility emotions 
recalled in the events by high and low ought discrepancy subjects in the 
present study. 
Hypotheses numbers 5 to 8 were about the relationship between high and 
low discrepancy levels (ideal as well as ought) with two other salient 
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features of the recalled events: the nature of outcome of the events and the 
overall affect of the events as rated by the subjects themselves. The results 
were in agreement with the hypotheses. Indviuals with a high discrepancy 
(both ideal and ought) recalled more number of events with a negative 
outcome and rated the events as more unpleasant. The subjects with a low 
discrepancy (both ideal and ought) recalled more events with a positive 
outcome and rated the events as significantly more pleasant in nature. 
The recall of negative and unpleasant events by high discrepancy sub-
jects (ideal, ought) indicates the presence of low self esteem in the subjects 
which is a characteristic feature of people possessing a high self discrepancy 
(Higgins, 1987). Studies have shown that negative events lead to negative 
psychological consequences such as low self esteem, and give rise to 
negative emotions such as depression,anxiety,frustration,guilt,and a feeling 
of negative wellbieng (Coopersmith , 1967,1968; Festinger ,1957; Higgins 
et al.,1986; Higgins, 1987; Lewinsohn and Graf 1979; Reich and Zautra 
,1987; Sullivan ,1953; Vinokur and Selzer ,1975; Zautra and Reich ,1983). 
The negative events recalled by high discrepancy subjects also hint at self 
goals or self expectations that are yet to be achieved ,or which the person has 
failed to achieve after repeated attempts to so. Bruhn (1985) in his cognitive 
perceptual theory ,stated that events with negative affect point towards an 
unresolved issue , and the urge to resolve the issue is what makes the event 
accessible to the individual. In the case of a high ideal discrepancy, 
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the issue to be resolved could be fulfilling of certain self goals (or certain 
ideals which others wish him to attain) whereas in the case of a high ought 
discrepancy, it could be the fulfillment of one's own expectations and 
obligations (or the fulfillment of others' expectations regarding himself). 
Failure to fulfill these self ideals and expectations causes the event to be 
accessible in memory until the target goal or expectation is fulfilled or 
achieved by the individual. 
In contrast the recall of positive and pleasant events by both low ideal 
and low ought discrepancy subjects indicates the presence of high self 
esteem and a positive mood as compared to high discrepancy individuals. 
Positive events have been shown to elicit pleasant feelings such as happi-
ness, pride, and global self esteem which in turn enhances the person's 
optimism about the future and promotes psychological wellbeing 
(Coopersmith,1967, 1968; Lewinsohn and Graf, 1979; Reich and Zautra, 
1981, 1987; Veit and Ware, 1983; Zautra and Reich, 1983). According to 
Bruhn (1985) events with positive affect reflect the presence of strong 
needs in the individual, and also help the individual to ward off negative affect 
that may arise out of negative situations. In the case of low discrepancy 
subjects, past events in which the individual has achieved a self goal or 
fulfilled a self expectation, would reflect the individual's need to achieve a 
self standard. Such an event would help the individual in maintaining his 
current concept of himself, and may be recalled in the future whenever the 
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individual needs to reaffirm his self concept. In contrast if the individual 
comes across a situation which threatens his self concept, the individual will 
ward off possible negative affect by recalling and/or reconstructing past 
events from memory that confirm the particular part of his self concept 
being threatened. 
Thus it is suggested that high as well as low discrepancy subjects recall 
and reconstruct the nature of outcome and overall affect of the events in a 
manner consistent with their self concept. It seems that the outcome and 
overall affect of the recalled events as rated by the subjects helps them in 
maintaining, rather than reducing, the level of discrepancy that they possess. 
Focusing on the outcome of the event and the affect it elicts leads the 
individual to become aware of his own competence, and may either confirm 
or disconfirm certain attributes of his self concept after comparing them 
with his self standard. An event that confirms a self standard, for example 
would make the individual happy and satisfied, and would be classified by the 
individual as a positive and pleasant event. Such an event would be more 
accessible to an individual who is either currently happyor satisfied, or who 
is by nature predisposed to be so, since the events reflects the current mood 
of the person. However an event that disconfirms a self standard would make 
the individual feel distressed, anxious, or even guilty, and would be classi-
fied and stored into memory by the individual as a negative and unpleasant 
event. Such an event would be more accessible to individuals who are 
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currently distressed, anxious, or guilty, etc, or who are by nature predisposed 
to experience negative moods. 
Hypotheses 9 and 10 were about the impact of positive and negative 
events on the individual at the time of occurrance of the event. The impact 
ratings were expected to reveal the extent of importance of the recalled 
events to the subjects. It was assumed that both positive and negative events 
would be equally important to the subjects because the events that are 
acceseible from autobiographical memory usually "preserve major lessons 
learned about the self, others, or the world, or they may focus on major 
issues that are unresolved and currently in process" (Bruhn, 1990, p.97). 
Such events that help the individual to adapt to his surroudings will have 
lasting value for him, and will be accessible in memory as long as it is 
important to the individual. 
The result with respect to both high and low ideal and high and low ought 
discrepancy subjects individual no difference between high and low discrep-
ancy subjects with respect to impact ratings of positive events. However, a 
difference was found between high and low discrepancy subjects with re-
spect to the impact ratings of negative events. This result was contrary to the 
hypothesis of no difference between the impact ratings of negative events 
for both levels of ideal and ought discrepancy. This result indicates that 
negative events have had more impact on discrepancy subjects as compared 
to low discrepancy subjects. However, the recall of negative events by 
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subjects with a low discrepancy implies that these events still hold some 
importance for the individual, and may point towards certain discrepancies 
that still exist within the individual, and which has not yet been fully resolved 
by the subject. Negative events recalled by individals with a high self esteem 
may also reveal a major lesson that has been previously learned by the 
subject, and may reflect increased coping skills and an increased determina-
tion to resolve the issue (Bruhn, 1985). It is to be noted that the cognitive 
perceptual theory with its emphasis on man's innate need to grow and extend 
his range of competence dose not assume that negative events cannot have as 
much impact as positive events.One of the major propositions of the theory 
is "Memory is organised according to the adaptive principle of utility. That 
which is percieved as most useful is highlighted, energized, and raised to a 
position of prominence in long-term memory" (Bruhn, 1990, p. 110). Thus, 
negative events may also have an impact on the person as do positive events 
because both of them have adaptive value. Events belonging to the negative 
category reflect 'work in process', 'unfinished business' and the 'next step' to 
be accomplished,which events, besides reminding the individual of situa-
tions in which his major needs were satisfied, help the individual to stabilize 
his mood by providing hope during frustrating and difficult moments. 
The result of the difference between high and low discrepancy subjects 
(both ideal and ought) with respect to the impact of negative events could 
also have been inflenced by the number of negative events recalled by high 
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ought discrepancy subjects. There is always the possibility of frequent 
occuranceof either postive or negative events in the life of a person, and this 
frequency may greatly influence the self concept of an individual. The 
results of recall of greater number of negative events along with their greater 
impact ratings by high ideal discrepancy subjects suggests that negative 
events are much more important for them than they are for the low discrep-
ancy groups. This indicates that subjects with a high discrepancy are more 
threatened by the unresolved issues highlighted by the recalled negative 
events. An unresolved issue could be the need to fulfill a self ideal, expec-
tation or obligation, or an ideal goal, an obligation, or duty that a siginficant 
other expects him to fulfill. Failure to meet these self standards induces 
discomfort in the individual and he may experience emotions to which he is 
particularly susceptible, such as dissatisfaction, disappointment, depres-
sion (ideal discrepancy), guilt,anxiety, fear, or even embarassment (ought 
discrepancy). This discomfort will cause the events to be accessible from 
memory unless and until the issue at hand is resolved. Contrary to high 
discrepancy subjects, the low discrepancy groups may not have felt as 
threatened by the negative consequences of the events and as such were able 
to overcome the discomfort produced by the negative event more easily than 
high discrepancy subjects. 
The last two hypotheses were about the percieved nature of the encoun-
ters between the subjects and the significant others in the past. It was to be 
133 
independently for each level of discrepancy across the five age ranges 
revealed that (i)the highest instance of Ab PR by significant other was 
percieved by HIDS in the events recalled from the age ranges 11-15 years and 
16-20 years, while (ii) the LIDS and recalled similar number of Pr PR given 
to them by significant other in the events across all five age ranges, as these 
was no significant difference between the means of age range from which the 
events were recalled. 
The result indicates that LIDS recalled the behaviour of significant other 
towards them as providing more positive reinforcements, while HIDS re-
called the behaviour of significant others towards them as lacking in positive 
reinforcements. Content analysis of the recalled events showed that the type 
of reinforcement given by the significant other depends upon the behaviour 
exhibited by HIDS and LIDS. It was found that HIDS recieved more behaviour 
representing Ab PR when they failed to live upto the significant others 
ideals, hopes and wishes, while LIDS recieved Ab PR considerably less than 
HIDS when they failed to live upto other's ideals. Prominent among Ab PR 
behaviour for HIDS were withdrawal of significant others from the subject 
(24.13%), lack of love (44.25%) lack of approval (68.39%) and discourage-
ment (54.59%) whereas such reinforcements for LIDS were very low. The 
themes of a large number of recalled events by HIDS were about acadamic 
failure, or failure to achieve unusually high standards in co-curricular 
activities such as sport, debates, and in one instance, singing. Such themes 
were natural since all the subjects were from the student population, and 
since students tend to look at success or failure mostly in terms of academic 
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ascertained whether individuals with different types and levels of discrep-
ancy mention specific type of reinforcement behaviour by the significant 
other to wards the subject in the recalled events. The differences between the 
discrepancy groups were examined with respect to the events that were 
supposed to have taken place at different age ranges from which the events 
wereto be recalled. 
Hypothesis number 11 regarded the differences between high and low 
ideal discrepancy subjects with respect to two types of reinforcement 
behaviour: (i) presence of positive reinforcement (Pr PR) such as praise, 
reward, encouragement, love, and attention and (ii) absence of positive 
reinforcements (Ab PR) such as lack of praise, reward, encouragement, love 
and approval. The results of two ANOVAS one for presence and the other for 
absence of positive reinforcements revealed significant main effects for 
discrepancy as well as age, but no interaction effect was observed which 
indicates that both factors of discrepancy and age independantly affect the 
recall from the memory the type of reinforcement behaviour of significant 
others. Comparison of the means of high ideal discrepancy subjects (HIDS) 
and low ideal discrepancy subjects (LIDS) on each age range with respect to 
Pr PR and Ab PR revealed significant differences between the means across 
all five age ranges from which events were recalled, with higher means for 
HIDS on Ab PR and for LIDS on Pr PR. The protected t's calculated 
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achievements, thier ideal standards are usually related to achievements in 
school/college. Thus, a failure to achieve these ideal standards (own as well 
as other) could result in feelings of discomfort associated with dejection 
(Higgins 1987). The events recalled by HIDS are thus essentially negative in 
nature and reflect unfinished business and the 'next step' to be accomplished, 
which is the achievement of one's ideal standards in order to win the approval 
of significant others. The recalled events by HIDS thus may be said to help 
the individual in maintaining the discrepancy rather than reducing it. 
Although HIDS recalled maximum number of Ab PR in age ranges 11-15 
years and 16-20 years which suggests that the period of adolescence and pre 
adulthood may have been more influenced by the Ab PR of significant others, 
no definite pattern regarding age is noticed in this regard. 
In contrast to HIDS, LIDS were found to recall more positive reinforce-
ments in their events in which they were able to fulfill the ideal, hopes and 
wishes that their significant others held for them. They recieved from 
significant others reinforcements of praise (50%) emotional support 
(50.59%)love (82.14%) and approval (55.75%) and encouragement (73.21%). 
The significant others also expressed their happiness and satisfaction to the 
subject on his achievements. Once again, as with HIDS, LIDS recalled events 
that were mostly related to their academic life, around which their ideal 
standards revolved, for eg, securing top position in class. Achieving their 
own ideal self standards, or the standards that others have set for them 
induces feelings of pleasantness associated with elation (happiness, 
satisfaction.excitement. jov. ect). The gratification of the need to be appre-
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ciated by others whom the individual values the most is what makes the event 
important enough to be accessible in memory, since it reflects a major 
lesson that the subject has learned - ie, that in order to win the appreciation 
and love of others, he/she must fulfill the ideal that others wish the individual 
to achieve. Thus, the events recalled by LIDS may also be said to help the 
individual maintain his present low level of discrepancy. 
Hypotheses number 12 was about the differences between high ought 
discrepancy subjects (HODS) and low ought discrepancy subjects (LDDS) 
with respect to (i) presence of negative reinforcements (Pr NR) and (ii) 
absence of negative reinforcements (Ab NR). The ANO VA' S on both types of 
reinforcement behaviour with respect to both discrepancy and age factors 
revealed a main effect only for discrepancy, but not for age. No interaction 
was revealed between the two, which indicates that only the levels of 
discrepancy have an effect on the recall of the type of reinforcement 
behaviour from memory. The differences between means revealed higher 
means for HODS on Pr NR, and higher means for LODS on Ab NR. The 
protected t's for each level of discrepancy across all five age ranges indi-
cated that (i) HODS recalled most number of negative reinforcements in the 
age range of 6-10 years, while (ii) LODS recalled most number of Ab NR 
behaviour in 0-5 years age range. 
The results suggest that HODS percieved the behaviour of significant 
other as more punishing (30.37%),critical (36.82%) interfering (65.82%) 
and controlling (61.3 9%), when he could not live upto the expectations that 
the others had for him. Even efforts to live upto expectations and obligations 
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of significant others lead to criticism and interference and controlling 
behaviour by the significant other. Examples of recalled events which elic-
ited negative behaviour from significant others were failing in school/ 
college, unruly behaviour, arguements with parents, or choosing a career that 
the parents were opposed to. Failure to measure upto the standards expected 
by others resulted in negative feelings such as anxiety, fear, guilt, shame, and 
embarassment among others, all related to agitation (Higgins,1987). The 
individual thus labels events that produce negative emotions as negative, and 
thus, the event reflects unresolved issues. The 'next step' that the individual 
tries to achieve is fulfillment of his ought standards, or the standards that he 
(or someone else) believes he ought to achieve. The recalled events by 
HODS thus once again help the subjects in justifying and maintaining a high 
level of ought discrepancy. 
In contrast to HODS, LODS when not able to fulfill certain expectations, 
were less criticized, (23.78%), punished (13.10%), or rejected (8.73%), by 
their significant others. And when they fulfilled their expected duties and 
obligations, they were-j 
^rev ^rewarded (42.71%) praised (41.26%) and accepted (45.63%) by the 
significant others, and also encouraged by them. Such parental behaviour has 
been found to instill a feeling of wellbeing as well as high self esteem in the 
individual (Coopersmith, 1968: Hauser et al., 1985; Werner and Smith, 
1982). Such positive events elicit positive feelings of confidence and 
security within the person, who realises that he will be accepted by his 
parents, in particular, even if sometimes fails to live upto their expectations. 
137 
This is the major lesson learnt by the LODS and thus the events are stored 
in long term memory to be recalled during similar future episodes Such 
events help in stabilizing and maintaining the individual's present view of 
himself. Thus, the LODS maintain their discrepancy and prevent it from 
increasing whenever the self concept is threatened by adverse events. 
The above results regarding the different types of reinforcement 
behaviour by significant others towards the individual possessing different 
levels of discrepancies supported Higgins (1987) assumption regarding 
HIDS and HODS with respect to negative parental behaviour. The importance 
of parental influence as well as of significant other has been stressed upon 
in the psycholgical literature. Many believe that this influence is greatest in 
childhood, a time when parents exert control over the child's likes and 
dislikes (Adler, 1958; Bruhn and Bellow, 1984; Coopersmith, 1967, 1968; 
Freud, 1927; Rogers, 1951; Sullivan, 1940, 1953). A sense of self worth is 
instilled in the child by teaching him to behave in an acceptable manner 
towards society, first by the parents in early years, and later by different 
significant others (Rogers, 1957). The fact that negative reinforcements by 
others (usually the parents) lead to a low self esteem and negative feelings 
in the individual has been supported by others (Coopersmith, 1968, Hauser 
et al., 1985; Werner and Smith, 1982). Since the reinforcements by signifi-
cant others led the individual to recall emotions that were congruent with the 
type of discrepancy that they possessed, the results imply that the subjects 
reconstructed the past events from memory in order that they fit in with their 
present attitudes and mood. This reconstruction serves the purpose of 
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maintaining the level of discrepancy present in the individual, so as to retain 
stability of the self concept. It may be possible that in the long run, an 
individual will change his attitudes and thus his self discrepancy. In that case 
according to Bruhn (1990) the individual must modify his existing events in 
memory to reflect these changes, and thus, "new memories (events), which 
were previously unavailable to consciousness, may surface, consistent with 
the principle of attraction", (p. 109). Future reseach may be directed to see 
whether a change in the level of discrepancy in an individual corresponds to 
a change inthe recollection of events from memory. 
Conclusion : 
In conclusion, our findings support the assertion of Higgins (1987) Self 
Discrepancy theory regarding the availabilit>' and accesibility of dejection 
and agitation related emotions from the memory of individual possessing 
high actual and ought discrepancies respectively, and confirmed his assump-
tions regarding the relationship of (i) presence of low ideal discrepancy with 
elation related emotions, and (ii) particular kinds of negative reinforcement 
behaviour by significant others with the presence of a high discrepancy 
(ideal, ought). The findings regarding the kind and intensity of emotions, the 
nature of outcome and the rated overall affect of the by high and low 
discrepancy subjects supported Bruhn and Bellow's (1984) Cognitive Per-
ceptual theory and Bruhn's (1985, 1990) theoretical formulations regarding 
the influence of present attitudes and mood on the recall of autobiographical 
memory. The findings of the present study also suggest the directions which 
future research mav advance. As mentioned earlier, there is a need to conduct 
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studies on the nature of past events recalled by individuals who have crossed 
certain developmental stages as suggested by Erikson (1964, 1968 ). The 
study of the relationship between the age and content of recalled events 
would help us to ascertain the unexplored theoretical expectation of Higgins 
regarding the relationship of tranquility related emotions with different 
levels of discrepancies. 
Another direction which future research may take is to find out if 
content of recalled events suggest whether an individual's present discrep-
ancy may be increased, decreased, or maintained in the future. Bruhn (1985) 
identified five distinct patterns that may appear in the recalled series of an 
individual's early memories that reflect their coping mechanisms used in 
various situations. These patterns may help to indicate the extent to which 
the individual possesses or lacks the inner resources necessary to resolve 
conflicts and problems (recent or deep-rooted) so that his/her discrepancy 
level may be reduced, and the level of self of esteem raised. It may also be 
interesting to analyse the content of recalled past events of individual whose 
discrepancies have increased or decreased over a period of time, and to 
examine the differences in content befoic and after the change in the level 
of discrepancy with respect to the factors identified in the present study. 
Chapter-6 
SUMMARY 
The problem : 
The present study was an attempt to bring together advances in research 
regarding autobiographical memory and recall of past life events, and the 
theo^tical formulations of Higgins (1987) regarding the association of self 
discrepancies (ideal, ought) with specific emotional vulnerabilities. The 
Cognitive- Perceptual theory (Bruhn and Bellow, 1984; also see Bruhn, 
1985, 1990) with its emphasis on reconstruction of past events and the 
adaptive principle of memories, along with Higgins (1987) assumptions in 
his Self Discrepancy theory regarding the availability and accessibi&y of 
dejection and agitation related emotions in the memories of high ideal and 
high ought discrepancy individuals respectively and the possible influence 
of significant others' reinforcement behaviour in the formation of discrep-
ancies led the present study to assume that the past life events recalled by 
individuals, with different kinds and levels of discrepancies, would reveal 
differences with respect to certain salient features of the recalled events, 
namely; (i) emotions and their intensity, (ii) nature of the outcome of the 
events, (iii) overall affect of the event,ft(iv) reinforcement behaviour of the 
significant other towards the individual. Since the events were supposed to 
be important or significant to the individual in some way, it was expected that 
there would be no difference between the discrepancy groups with respect to 
the impact of the event. 
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A review of past literature revealed that: 
(i) The self concept remains relatively stable over time, and the individual 
strives to maintain the stability and consistency of the self conceptHowever, 
a facet of the self concept may undergo a change if the individual goes 
through an experience which is strong and intense enough to affect the 
individuals beliefs and attitudes. 
(ii) Information which is relevant to the self is processed and stored into 
memory much more readily and is more easily available and accessible from 
memory than information that is not relevant to the self, 
(iii) Autobiographical memories, especially early memories (EMs) are a 
rich source of information about the personality make up of the individual, 
(iv) Self discrepancies arise when the individual is unable fulfill certain self 
standards that he has set for him self. The feedback that he recieves about 
himself from others, as well as the emotions he experiences and the manner 
in which he interprets the event coiife^ ibute to the formation of a discrepancy 
(or to the absence of it). 
In view of the Self Discrepancy theory of Higgins (1987), Bruhn and 
Bellow's (1984) Cognitive Perceptual theory, and the reviewed literature, 
the following hypotheses were formed; 
1. High ideal discrepancy subjects will recall more dejection - related 
emotions asociated with their past events, and will rate them more 
intensely than low ideal discrepancy subjects. 
2. Low ideal discrepancy subjects will recall more elation-related emo-
142 
tions associated with their past events, and will rate them more 
intensely than high ideal discrepancy subjects. 
3*. High ought discrepancy subjects will recall more agitation - related 
emotions associated with their past events, and will rate them more 
intensely than low ought discrepancy subjects. 
4. Low ought discrepancy subjects will recall more tranquility - related 
emotions associated with their past events, and will rate them more 
intensely than low ought discrepancy subjects. 
5. High discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought) will recall more 
events with negative outcomes than will low discrepancy subjects. 
6. Low discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought) will recall more 
events with positive outcomes than will high discrepancy subjects. 
7. High discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought) will rate the overall affect 
of the recalled events as more unpleasant than low discrepancy subjects. 
8. Low discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought) will rate the overall 
effect of the recalled events as more pleasant than will high 
discrepancy subjects. 
9. There will be no difference between the impact ratings of positive events 
recalled by high and low discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought). 
10. There will be no difference between the impact ratings of negative events 
recalled by high and low discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought). 
11. The behaviours of the significant other towards high ideal 
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discrepancy subjects in the recalled events will be more indicative of 
an absence of positive reinforcements, whereas for low ideal discrep-
ancy subjects, the behaviour of the significant other will be more 
indicative of a presence of positive reinforcements. 
12. The behaviour of the significant other towards high ought 
discrepancy subjects in the recalled events will be more indicative of 
a presence of negative reinforcements, whereas for low ought dis-
crepancy subjects, the behaviour of the significant other in the re-
called event will be more indicative of an absence of negative rein-
forcements. 
Method : 
In order to test the above hypotheses, post graduate students from various 
departments of A.M.U., Aligarhj,JThe final sample consisted of 82 subjects. 
Three tools were used for collecting data ; 
(i)Self Discrepancy questionnaire : This was a modified form of Higgins, 
Klein and Straumans' (1985) Selves questionnaire. Subjects were required 
to listto attributes for each of four self states actual: own, ideal: own, ideal: 
other, and ought other. They then had to rate each attribute on a four point 
scale that ranged from slightly possess (1) to extremely possess (4). On the 
basis of their discrepancy scores, the subjects were coded into four dis-
crepancy groups: high ideal discrepancy subjects (HIDS), low ideal discrep-
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ancy subjects (LIDS), high ought discrepancy subjects (HODS) and low 
ought discrepancy subjects (LODS). 
(ii) Life Event Interview : Subjects were required to recall five significant, 
important life events in detail, one from each age range - 0-5 years, 6-10 
years, 11-15 years, 16-20 years, and above 21 years. Details regarding the 
kind of emotions experienced, nature of outcome of the event, overall affect, 
impact of event and reinforcement behaviour of significant others were paid 
attention to . 
(iii) Life Event Rating Scale : This scale consisted of two parts. The first 
part consisted of rating scales pertaining to (a) number of emotions and their 
intensity, (b) nature of outcome (c) overall affect and (d) impact of event. 
The second part consisted of different content categories regarding pres-
ence and absence of both positive as well as negative reinforcements by the 
significant other towards the subject in the recalled event. 
Three kinds of statistical analyses were applied to the data obtained (i) Chi 
square (X ) was used to analyse the number of emotions recalled by differ-
ent discrepancy groups inthe events, as well as the ratings of the nature of 
outcome of the events; (b) Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was applied to the 
intensity ratings of emotions, the ratings of overall affect of the event, and 
the impact of the event as rated by the subjects; and (c) Two way ANOVA was 
applied to the data related to reinforcement behaviour of significant other in 
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the memory. 
Results and Conclasion : 
The results revealed that; 
(i) High discrepancy subjects (ideal and ought) recalled more number of 
dejection and agitation related emotions respectively, and rated these emo-
tions higher than did low discrepancy subjects. However, LIDS recalled only 
a greater number of elation related emotions in the recalled events as 
compared to HIDS, with no difference between both groups with respect to 
the intensity ratings. There was no difference between high and low ought 
discrepancy subjects with respect to the number and intensity of tranquJity 
related emotions. 
(ii) High discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought) rated more events as 
having a negative outcome, which low discrepancy subjects (both ideal and 
ought) rated the outcome of events as being more positive in nature, 
(iii) High discrepancy subjects (both ideal and ought) rated the overall 
affect of the recalled events as more unpleasant, while low discrepancy 
subjects (both ideal and ought) rated the overall affect of the recalled events 
as more pleasant in nature. 
(iv) With respect to the impact of the recalled events,it was found that high 
discrepancy subjects (ideal, ought) rated the impact of negative events as 
higher than did low discrepancy subjects. However, with respect to the 
impact ratings of positive events, no significant difference was observed 
between high and low ideal, and high and low ought discrepancy groups. 
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(v) For the ideal discrepancy group, significant main effects for both level 
of discrepancy and age range specificatio ns were found with respect to 
absence of positve reinforcements [F (discp)= 83.46; F (age)= 2.909] and 
presence of positive reinforcement [F(discp)= 83.55; F(age)= 2.46]. No 
significant interaction was observed which indicated that the effects of level 
of discrepancy and the age range from which events were recalled were 
independent of one another. The values of the difference between the means 
of high and low ideal discrepancy subjects with respect to both presence and 
absence of positive reinforcement across all age range were found to be 
significant with the higher discrepancy group having higher means for 
absence of positive reinforcement, and low discrepancy subjects having 
higher means for presence of positive reinforcements. This indicated that 
HIDS recalled the behaviour of significant other as being indicative of an 
absence of positive reinforcements while LIDS recalled the significant 
others behaviour as more indicative of a presence of positive reinforce-
ments. 
For the ought discrepancy group, a significant main effect was found only for 
level of discrepancy (F for presence of negative reinforcement = 58.81; F 
for absence of negative reinforcement = 58.28). No significant main effect 
was found for age range specifications, and no interaction was observed. The 
means of high and low ought discrepancy subjects with respect to both 
presence and absence of negative reinforcements across all age range were 
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found to be significantly different from each other, with HODS having higher 
means for presence of and LODS having higher means for absence of 
negative reinforcements.lhese resulfeindicate that HODS recalled the sig-
nificant other's behaviour as being more indicative of a presence of negative 
reinforcements, while LODS recalled the behaviour of significant others as 
being indicative of an absence of negative reinforcements. 
The result supported the assertions of Higgins (1987) regarding the availabilty 
and accessibility of dejection and agitation related emotions in the memory 
of predominantly high ideal and high agitation discrepancy individuals 
respectively,and his assumptions regarding the relationship of low ideal 
discrepancy (or an absence of it) with elation related emotioiK,The relation-
ship between low ought discrepancy and the availability and accessibility of 
tranquility emotions in memory was however, not confirmed. Higgins as-
sumptions regarding particular kinds of reinforcement behaviour by signifi-
cant others and its relationship with presence of discrepancies was also 
confirmed by the results. The findings regarding the kind and intensity of 
emotions, nature of outcome and overall affect of the event supported Bruhn 
and Bellow's (1984) Cognitive Perceptual theory, as well as Bruhns(1985, 
1990) theoretical formulations regarding the influence of present attitudes 
and mood on the recall of autobiographical memories. 
The future directions which research in the area of self discrepancies and 
past autobiographical memories may take place are: (i) recall of autobio-
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graphical memories from individuals who have crossed certain developmen-
tal stages would help to explore Higgins assumption regarding the relation-
ship of tranquility related emotions with different levels of discrepancy; (ii) 
the content of recalled events are to be further examined to see whether they 
provide any indications as to the increase or decrease of discrepancies 
within the individual as time passes. 
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Appendix -I (a) 
Percentages of presence / absence of positive reinforcements in the content 
of recalled events by high and low ideal discrepancy subjects. 
Content Categories 
1. When the subject did not live upto their ideals, 
the person : 
(a) Withdrew form the subject, 
(b) Did not withdraw from the subject. 
(c) Emotionally abandoned the subject. 
(d) Did not emotionally abandon the subject. 
(e) Paid little or no attention to the subject. 
(f) Paid attention 
2. When the subject lived upto their ideals. 
the person : 
(a) Praised the subject 
(b) Did not praise the subject 
(c) Emotionally supported the subject 
(d) Did not emotionally support the subject 
(e) Paid attention 
(f) Did not pay attention 
3. The person(s) did not, or could not. 
satisfy the subject's need for: 
(a) Love 
(b) Approval 
(c) Support and to be looked after 
4. The person(s) satisfied the subject's need for : 
(a) Love 
(b) Approval 
(c) Support and to be looked after 
5. The person(s) often communicated to the 
subject their own feeling of: 
(i) Disappointment/dissatisfaction 
(ii) Hopelessness 
(iii) Sadness 
(iv) Discouragement 
(v) Elation/Satisfaction 
(vi) Hopefulness 
(vii) Happiness 
(viii) Encouragement 
High 
24.13 
32.75 
27.58 
33.33 
36.78 
28.16 
25.28 
12.06 
25.28 
13.21 
29.31 
10.91 
44.25 
68.39 
38.50 
48.27 
28 16 
55.74 
64.94 
43.67 
52.87 
54.59 
30.45 
44.82 
39.08 
42.52 
Low 
5.95 
38,09 
3.57 
37,50 
17.85 
28.57 
50.00 
4.16 
50.59 
2.97 
52.97 
2.38 
14.88 
39.28 
11.30 
82 14 
55.95 
77.97 
39.88 
15.47 
26.78 
23.80 
54.16 
80.95 
70.83 
73.21 
I I 
Appendix II (b) 
Percentages of presence / absence of negative reinforcements in the content 
of recalled events by high and low ought discrepancy subjects. 
Content Categories 
1. When the subject did not behave as thetype of 
individual the person believed he/she ought to 
behave, the person : 
(a) Criticized the subject 
(b) Did not criticize the subject 
(c) Punished the subject 
(d) Did not punish the subject 
(e) Rejected the subject 
(f) Did not reject the subject 
2. When the subject's behaviour did not 
live up to their expectations the person: 
(a) Communicated their worries about 
the subject, 
(b) Did not communicate their worries 
(c) Communicated their own fear & 
dread of the world in general 
(d) Did not communicated their own fear & ( 
3. When the subject behaved as the type of 
individual the person believed he ought 
to behave like, the person ; 
(a) Criticized the subject 
(b) Praised the subject 
(c) Punished the subject 
(d) Rewarded the subject 
(e) Accepted/acknowledged the subject's deed 
(f) Rejected/dismissed the subject's deed 
Iread. 
4. When the subject's behaviour lived up to the person's 
expectations, the person: 
(a) Communicate their worries about the subject 
(b) Communicated their satisfaction about th e subject 
(c) Communicated their own fear & dread about 
the world. 
(d) Communicated their own reassurance. 
optimism,and encouragement about the 
world in general. 
High 
36.07 
23.41 
30.37 
25.94 
24.68 
35.44 
44.93 
16.45 
29.74 
28.48 
15.18 
24.05 
14.55 
22.15 
10.12 
28.63 
19.62 
17.08 
19.62 
24.05 
Low 
23.78 
30.09 
13.10 
32.52 
8.73 
40.77 
31.06 
18.44 
12.62 
73 88 
7.28 
41.26 
5.33 
42.71 
3.39 
45.63 
9.70 
33.98 
n 65 
39.32 
I l l 
5. In order to make the subject the type of 
individual the person believed he/she 
ought to be like, the person was; 
(a) Interfering 
(b) Non-Interfering 
(c) Controlling 
(d) Non-controlling 
High 
65.82 
34.17 
61.39 
37.97 
Low 
48.05 
45.14 
38.34 
55.82 
Percentage calculated as below: 
Total frequency of the category across all age ranges .^^ 
Total number of subjects 
IV 
Appendix - II (a) 
Self Discrepancy Questionnaire 
Part - I (Own Self) 
Instructions : 
We are interested in knowing your views about yourself in regard to 
the following: (1) what you actually are; and (2) what you ideally desire to be. 
L Actual - Own : 
Your first task is to give a list of ten qualities / attributes of your 
'actual self, i.e., the qualities which you think you actually have. Please think 
about yourself and write your qualities in the column given below. To help 
you to know that you have listed all the qualities, serial numbers from 1 to 
10 are given in the left hand margin. 
S.No. Qualities/Attributes Rating 
1, 
2. 
3. 
4, 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9 
10. 
Slightly 
possess 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Extremely 
possess 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Having listed the qualities/attributes, you next task is to indicate, how 
much each of the listed qualities you think you have. This can be indicated by 
encircling one of the numbers given against each quality/attribute. Please 
note that encircling number 1 indicates that you slightly possess the quality. 
and encircling number 4 indicates that you extremely possess the quality. 
That is, as you move from number 1 to number 4, it would indicate that you 
possess the quality to a greater extent. 
II - Ideal - Own : 
Your next task is to list 10 qualities of your 'ideal self. The ideal self 
can be simply defined as a representation of the qualities/attributes that you 
would hope for and aspire to attain, in order to make yourself a more ideal 
person. 
S.No. Qualities/Attributes Rating 
Slightly 
possess 
1 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8 
9. 
10, 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Extremely 
possess 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Having listed the qualities of your ideal self, you have to rate each 
quality to indicate the extent of your desirability to possess the quality. To 
do this, encircle one number on the line against each attribute under the 
heading 'Rating'. Remember that as you move from 1 to 4, it indicates that 
you wish to possess the quality to a greater extent. 
VI 
Self Discrepancy Questionnaire 
Part - II (Other Self) 
Instructions : 
We are interested in knowing the views of other people about yourself, 
with respect to the following : (1) The qualities/attributes they would like 
you, ideally, to possess; (2) the qualities/attributes they believe that it is 
your duty or obligation to have. 
I l l . Ideal - Other : 
For the first task, you must first think about and select a person who 
knows you very well, to whom you are very close, and whose ideas and 
opinions you value the most (for e.g., father, mother, or closest friend). 
Then, keeping this person in mind, list 10 qualities/attributes which the 
person would like you to ideally possess. Please list the attributes in the 
column given below under the heading "Qualities/Attributes". 
S.No. Qualities/Attributes Rating 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Slightly 
possess 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Ext 
po 
remely 
ssess 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Having listed the qualities, you have to rate how important it is to the 
other person that you ideally possess each of the qualities. Encircling 
number 1 would indicate that the other person thinks it is slightly important 
that you possess the quality, and encircling number 4 would indicate that the 
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other person thinks that it is extremely important that you possess the 
quality. That is, as you move up the scale, it indicates that you possess the 
quality to a greater extent. 
IV. Ought - Other : 
For the second task, think about and select a person who knows you 
very well, and whose values, ideas and opinions you respect the most (for 
e.g., father, mother, close friend, etc.). Then, in the column provided below, 
first list ten qualities or attributes which that person believes that it is your 
duty and responsibility to possess. 
S.No. Qualities/Attributes Rating 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Slightly 
possess 
] 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Exi remely 
possess 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Having listed the qualities/attributes you must then rate each quality 
to indicate how much according to the other person it is your duty and 
obligation to possess that quality/attribute. For e.g., encircling number 1 
will indicate that the other person thinks that your responsibility or duty to 
possess that quality is slight, and encircling 4 will indicate that the other 
person feels that your responsibility or duty to possess that quality is 
extreme. 
Name 
Age 
Date 
Sex Class 
Vlil 
Appendix -11 (b) 
Life Event Rating Scale 
Part -1 
Instructions : 
You have just recalled an important past event that had occurred to you 
at a particular age in your life. You are now requested to rate certain aspects 
of the event on the four rating scales provided below. Read carefully the 
instructions provided for each rating scale, and rate each aspect as accurately 
as possible. 
1. Emotions and their intensity : 
You are requested to think about the emotions that you experienced at 
the time when the event actually occurred to you. Write down the emotions 
in the column provided below. Then rate the intensity with which you 
experienced each emotion at the time of actual occurrance of the event with 
the help of the scale provided below. Number 1 indicates that the intensity of 
the emotion is very less and as you move up the scale, the numbers subse-
quently indicate an increase in the intensity of the emotion, and number 7 
indicates that the intensity is very great. Write down the number you have 
chosen in the column provided alongside each emotion. 
Age range from which 
which event was recalled 
Emotions Rating 
0 - 5 years 
6 - 10 years 
11 -15 years 
16-20 years 
21vrs.-above 
1. 
2.-
3.. 
! . • 
2.-
3.' 
1. 
1.-
3.' 
! • 
2.-
3,-
1. -
2.-
3.-
(Contd. next page) 
Intensity Scale For Emotions 
Very less 
iz 
Very much 
2. Nature of the Event: 
You are requested to think about the outcome (ending) of the event 
that you have just recalled and rate it as either positive (P) or negative (N), 
in the manner you percieve it to be. Tick either P or N in the column provided 
alongside the age range from which you have recalled the event. 
Age range from which 
event was recalled 
0 - 5 years 
6-10 years 
11-15 years 
16-20 years 
21 yrs. - above 
(P = 
Rating 
 Positive; N = Negative) 
P / N 
P / N 
P / N 
P / N 
P / N 
3. Degree of pleasantness/unpleasantness of the event: 
Now think about the whole event, and rate it how far to the was pleasant 
or unpleasant for you at the time of its occurrance. Tick the chosen number 
in the column provided alongside the age range from which you have recalled 
the event. 
Age range from which 
event was recalled 
0 - 5 years 
6-10 years 
11-15 years 
16-20 years 
21 yrs. - above 
Very Pleasant 
pleasant 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
Rating 
Unpleasant 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Very 
unpleasant 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4. Impact of the event: 
Now, keeping the event in mind, think about the impact the event had 
made upon you at the time of its occurrance. Then indicate the degree of 
impact of the event using the scale given below. Number 1 indicates that the 
event had no impact on you, and number 4 indicates that the event had a great 
impact on you. Tick the chosen number in the column provided alongside the 
age range from which you have recalled the event. 
Age range from which 
event was recalled 
0 - 5 years 
6 -10 years 
11-15 years 
16-20 years 
21 yrs. - above 
No Impact 
Rating 
Little Impact Much 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Impact 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Great Impact 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
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Appendix-11(c) 
Life Event Rating Scale 
Part -11 
I. Presence/Absence of positive outcomes 
(Ideal Discrepancy) 
1. When the subject did not live upto their ideals 
the person ; 
(a) Withdrew form the subject, 
(b) Did not withdraw from the subject, 
(c) Emotionally abandoned the subject. 
(d) Did not emotionally abandon the subject. 
(e) Paid little or no attention to the subject, 
(f) Paid attention 
2. When the subject lived upto their ideals. 
the person : 
(a) Praised the subject 
(b) Did not praise the subject 
(c) Emotionally supported the subject 
(d) Did not emotionally support the subject 
(e) Paid attention 
(f) Did not pay attention 
3. The person(s) did not, or could not, 
satisfy the subject's need for: 
(a) Love 
(b) Approval 
(c) Support and to be looked after 
4. The person(s) satisfied the subject's need for; 
(a) Love 
(b) Approval 
(c) Support and to be looked after 
5. The person(s) often communicated to the. 
subjects their own feeling of: 
(i) Disappointment/dissatisfaction 
(ii) Hopelessness 
(iii) Sadness 
(iv) Discouragement 
(v) Elation/Satisfaction 
(vi) Hopefulness 
(vii) Happiness 
(viii) Encouragement 
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-At 
1 
II. Presence/Absence Negative Outcomes (Ought Discrepancy) 
XII 
1. When the subject did not behave as the 
type of individual the person believed 
he/she ought to behave, the person : 
(a) Critisized the subject 
(b) Did not critize the subject 
(c) Punished the subject 
(d) Did not punish the subject 
(e) Rejected the subject 
(f) Did not rej ect the subj ect 
2. When the subject behaved as the type of 
individual the person believed he ought 
to behave like, the person : 
(a) Critisized the subject 
(b) Praised the subject 
(c) Punished the subject 
(d) Rewarded the subject 
(e) Accepted/acknowledged the subject's dee( 
(f) Rejected/dismissed the subject's deed 
3. In order to make the subject the type of 
individual the person believed he/she 
ought to be like, the person was : 
(a) Interfering 
(b) Non-Interfering 
(c) Controlling 
(d) Non-controlling 
4. When the subject's behaviour did not 
live up to their expectations the person: 
(a) Communicated their worries about 
the subject, 
(b) Did not communicate their worries 
(c) Communicated their own fear & 
dread of the world in general 
(d) Did not communicated their own fear 
& dread. 
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-Ab 
XIII 
5. When the subject's behaviour lived up 
to the person's expectations, the person : 
(a) Communicate their worries about 
the subject 
(b) Communicated their satisfaction about 
the subject 
(c) Communicated their own fear & dread 
about the world, 
(d) Communicated their own reassurance, 
optimism,and encouragement about the 
world in general. 
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-Ab 
